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Political Responses 
to the Family
1
Under the rubric o f  "Political Responses to the Family" in this issue ALR publishes an 
abridged version o f  an American discussion paper on the fam ily and politics. Given in July 1981 
in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, at the annual convention o f  the New American M ovement (NAM ), a 
marxist-based organisation o f  US socialists, the paper provoked a vigorous debate on the issues 
raised by its authors, one o f  whom (Michael Lerner) is the co-ordinator o f  the Workers 
Occupational Health Centre, Oakland, California. Australians present at the N A M  convention 
brought the paper back to Australia and here it has likewise had an impact, apparently arousing 
strong feelings both fo r  and against.
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B rin g in g  It A l l  B a c k  H o m e
by Michael Lerner, Laurie Zoloth and Hon. Wilson Riles, 
Jnr.
The rightwing ideology that has gained 
national prominence and credibility in the 
past few years may soon be consolidated as 
the dominant world view in American life. 
The shooting of Ronald Reagan further 
intensifies the basic fears that are held by a 
majority of the American public: that 
personal life is in crisis, that life is no longer 
safe, that the few bastions of protection from 
the dangers of the larger world are themselves 
under attack. Because progressives and 
liberals have been reluctant to look seriously 
at these underlying feelings that are the 
bedrock upon which conservative ideas are 
allowed to flourish, they have consistently 
missed the point, and are now in danger of 
becoming relegated to a permanent minority 
status.
The reaction to the first half-year of the 
Reagan Presidency on the part of liberals and 
progressives has reflected this basic 
misunderstanding of what is really happening.
At first, we hear a chorus of denial: the right 
wing had only won a minority of the total 
electorate, and only a minority of those who 
voted for Reagan did so because they agreed 
with specific rightwing programs. What this 
missed was the reality that, faced with the 
choices as they understood them, more people 
felt comfortable with a rightwing candidacy 
than with any other choice except not voting. 
Moreover, the current dominance of the 
media and institutions that shape public 
opinion by ideas that the right wing has been 
pushing fo r decades gives them  an 
unprecedented opportunity to consolidate 
and grow, while alternative positions are 
virtually unheard of from any quarter.
We should understand that the ideas being 
put forward are not new: they have received 
considerable backing before by corporate 
America, but they were always counter­
balanced by an ideology of liberalism that had 
access to the media through its control nf the
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government. The collapse of the alternative is 
accelerated also by the reality that those 
remaining liberals have thought that their best 
survival strategy is to talk increasingly as 
though they were really conservatives all 
along.
A second reaction has been to put forward 
shocked outrage as budget cuts for social 
welfare programs have been coupled with 
increases in defence spending. The liberals 
have talked of putting together coalitions to 
protest the cuts, uniting all sectors affected. 
But these coalitions only unite the very sectors 
who were opposed to Reagan in the first place, 
and despite serious coalition attempts 
in v o lv in g  o rg an ised  la b o r ,  fem in is t 
organisations, third world groups and 
environmentalists, they were defeated in the 
last election.
Coalitions of the 1960s and '70s
The coalition-building strategy, perhaps 
cu lm in a tin g  in m ass m arches and 
demonstrations to dramatise how badly the 
cuts will affect some sectors of the population, 
comes from a different historical age: the 
1960s and early '70s, when millions of people 
took to the streets. But the difference is this: 
both Presidents Johnson and Nixon ran on 
programs of avoiding war and championing 
the oppressed. When they failed to do so, the 
movements in the streets could wear the 
mantle of moral outrage: the people were 
being lied to and betrayed by their elected 
officials. By uncovering public hypocrisy, we 
were, in fact, acting as the representatives of 
the majority of the population who had been 
tricked at the ballot box.
Reagan and the conservatives who were 
elected to the Congress did not lie to us: they 
were clear and forthright about their 
determination to cut social welfare programs, 
to dramatically cut the budget, to favor the 
needs of the corporations over the needs of the 
poor and to dramatically increase defence 
spending and take an aggressive and perhaps 
warlike position in the rest of the world. They 
won, they perceive themselves to have a 
mandate, and even demonstrations the size of
the 1960s would not undermine that 
perception.
A third reaction has been for progressives 
to reassure themselves that everything will 
work out because Reagan's economic policies 
won't work. Consoled by the prospect of 
rising unemployment and continued or 
perhaps even increased inflation, they see the 
discrediting of rightwing ideology as an 
inevitable development if we can just weather 
the next few years. There are several 
objections to this. First, rising human misery 
does not necessarily lead to rising radicalism: 
it can just as readily lead to increasing despair, 
passivity, or willingness to support military 
adventurism to restore US economic 
supremacy around the world. Second, 
Reagan's economic doctrines were not what 
won the election, but rather his ability to 
speak to the fears and insecurities of daily life.
If the right can consolidate their hold over 
mass consciousness in the period ahead, no 
set of economic difficulties will be in itself 
sufficient to dislodge their political strength. 
On the contrary, they may then be in a 
position to identify new scapegoats, new 
enemies whose programs and positions have 
thwarted the effectiveness of their economic 
policies. Whether it be a focus on the ways that 
liberals blocked some of the cuts that they had 
argued for, or whether it be through pointing 
the blame at Arab oil, or at the international 
communist conspiracy or the Soviet Union, 
the right wing will have sufficient arguments 
for deflecting the criticism.
The point is that the right wing did not win 
by having a better set of economic arguments 
than liberals, but rather because they spoke to 
the basic needs of the population for a 
different quality of life. People are willing to 
endure economic hardships, wars and 
domestic unrest if they believe that it is part of 
a larger plan that will eventually lead to a 
world tliat they really want. Theright winghas 
oeen able to harness moral righteousness 
and idealism as well as the fear and insecurity 
people face, and to address those needs in a 
way that has given them a political mandate.
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Our point comes into focus most clearly if 
we see how the right has used the issues of 
family life and crime. For two decades the 
right has hammered away at these issues, 
while liberals dismissed them as merely the 
prattling of reactionaries. Carter's creation of 
an Office of the Family inside the 
Administration for Children, Youth and 
Families, without any serious funding for it, 
had about as much impact as his White House 
Conference on the Family: both were window 
dressing that were transparent attempts to 
avoid these issues rather than deal with them.
The family issue and the growth of the right
Equally important, the right had the popul­
ar impression going for it that progressives, 
liberals and the women's movement were all 
indifferent at best or hostile at worst to the 
family lives of most Americans. It is the 
progressives who have come to be identified in 
mass consciousness with the position that 
individual liberty is the supreme value, that 
"do your own thing" must take precedence 
over long-term commitments, and that 
individual pursuit of pleasure is the goal of 
life. To som e e x te n t, this was a 
misunderstanding based on the fact that the 
progressives had greatest access to media in 
the late 1960s and early '70s when the 
c o n j u n c t u r e  o f  c o u n t e r - c u l t u r a l  
individualism and the early anti-nuclear 
family statements of some elements of the 
feminist movement were given dramatic 
public play. But to some extent it reflects a 
continued failure to understand and publicly 
legitimate the values that people seek to 
achieve in their family life. For many 
progressives there is a lingering suspicion of 
"family life", a suspicion based on their 
correct perception that many families are 
oppressive to the women and children within 
them.
The critics of the family suspect that many 
of the rightwing leaders who speak of 
supporting the family really have in mind a 
return to a patriarchal family with women 
subordinated and abandoning their work 
outside the home. That may be true of many of 
these leaders. But it is not for that reason that
so many people are responding. Rather, it is 
the vision of a family as the place where one is 
supposed to get nurturing and love, regardless 
of one's actual achievements in the world, that 
moves people to desire a defence of the family 
and a return to family values.
It is not to the point to argue that such a 
picture of family belies the reality that exists in 
many families, or that ever existed. That 
women have often been oppressed in families 
is certain. But that does not lead to a 
conclusion that families or family life should 
be downplayed, but rather that necessary 
changes are needed with regard to this aspect 
of family life. But when most people respond 
to the calls for a defence of family life, it is not 
because they yearn for a place to oppress 
women, but rather for a place where human 
love and intimacy can be treated as the highest 
value.
It is in recognising this yearning as valid 
and noble that the right wing can validate 
itself and its political and social message. The 
core feelings of despair over the demise of 
family life are then taken by the right, and 
attached to a specific social and political and 
economic program that has little to do with 
actually achieving the kind of vision that most 
people strive for. But they will be supported as 
long as 110 one else can speak to those same 
needs and desires. For example, the right can 
argue that it is gays, the women's movement, 
or even "government intervention in private 
life'' that are undermining family life, and 
though its analysis of exactly how these 
connections work may seem implausible or 
difficult to follow, it is nevertheless 
accepted by people and mouthed as a litany of 
truth. Why? Because most people have never 
heard any other explanation of the collapse of 
fam ilies . A nd because lib e ra ls  and  
progressives are identified with cultural 
themes like "If this relationship doesn't feel 
good, don't hassle with it — just go on to 
another one" or "Sexuality should be 
divorced from emotions — it's just another 
kind of fun. Enjoy it like good food", they 
seem* to be undervaluing the importance of 
building lasting relationships.
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It is time for progressives to consciously 
and publicly reverse these misconceptions by 
loudly and clearly identifying with the defence 
of the family, while insisting that the definition 
of family now be expanded to include single­
parent families, extended families, gay 
families and kinship networks.
What really undermines family life?
The moment we take up the challenge of the 
family, identify with it, and really commit 
ourselves to building a program for support 
of the family, we are in a dramatic position to 
fundamentally challenge the analysis and 
policies of the right. Once we ask ourselves, 
"How do we create a society within which 
long-term commitments to love, intimacy and 
emotional nurturing are really possible?" we 
see that it is precisely a progressive program 
that makes most sense.
The right is in an impossible contradiction: 
because, in fact, the destruction of the 
possibility of loving, creative family life has 
been a product of the economic market which 
the right is committed to defending. People 
feel that they are losing control of what is 
happening in their personal life, that they are 
being manipulated by outside forces, and that 
their basic support structures — families — 
are in danger of falling apart. Their feelings 
are correct. But the right identifies this with 
gays, or the women's movement, or 
"government intervention". In fact, these 
problems grow out of the way the economy 
and the workplace are organised.
Consider the world of work. Most workers 
face jobs that are increasingly stressful, as 
h u m a n  s a t i s f a c t io n s  d e c re a s e  and  
opportunities for real human interactions are 
diminished. The fragmentation of work, the 
deskilling of the work force, the difficulty of 
maintaining working class solidarity and the 
overt attacks on trade unions — all combine 
to create conditions in which the individual 
worker experiences stress — and typically 
interprets this as a personal problem instead
* This is often an unfair conclusion based on 
serious and important questions being raised 
about family. But this is the perception we must 
deal with.
of a collective dilemma for all workers to 
solve. Because stress manifests differently for 
different workers (for some as headaches, for 
others as neck or back tensions, for others as 
high blood pressure, for others as colitis, 
in s o m n ia , d e p re s s io n ,  w ith d ra w a l,  
alcoholism, drug abuse or frantic activity), 
most people rarely understand that they are 
facing a common work-related problem. 
Instead, they feel bad about themselves for 
having stress symptoms.
Male workers often compound these 
sources of self-blaming with a feeling that 
they should be tougher, and that the fact that 
they experience stress is an indication of 
personal lack of strength and manliness. In 
addition, because most workers believe that 
this is a meritocracy in which individual 
worth will be rewarded in the marketplace, 
when they experience their jobs as stressful 
they feel bad about themselves, sure that the 
stress is a reminder of their own failures as an 
individual to have achieved a better job. So a 
typical way that stress is handled is not by 
collective struggle to change the situation, but 
by individual denial, coupled with an 
internalisation of the stress. But that stress is 
then brought home, manifesting itself in 
tensions and irritations that grow out of hand.
When progressives have addressed these 
issues at all, it has usually been in a way that 
suggested that the individuals involved 
needed government help to deal with their 
"personal'' problems. Whether it be in 
s p o n s o r in g  a lc o h o l  p ro g ra m s  fo r  
rehabilitating the alcoholics, or community 
mental health clinics and individual therapy 
for "the troubled individual" or more recently 
"employee assistance" programs at the 
workplace, the liberal position has always 
reinforced the basic view that the worker has a 
personal problem. On the other hand, the 
right wing insists that this is a reflection of a 
common social problem labelled as "the 
breakdown of the family". This is insidious 
because of where it lays the blame, but it has 
actually been empowering to many working 
people because it tends to undermine self­
blame.
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The obvious move now is for progressives 
to join the right in defining these problems as 
common and social ones, but to correctly 
identify the source for this family breakdown 
in the current organisation of the workplace. 
This analysis leads us to say that the number 
one priority for supporting the family is to 
humanise the workplace in such a way that 
people come out of it strengthened in their 
ability to participate in loving and intimate 
re la tionsh ips ra th e r than  em otionally  
wrecked. And this, in turn, raises the issue of 
democratic control of work as a necessary 
part of family support, the issue of health and 
safety at work, and even consideration of the 
30-hour work week and strict prohibitions on 
forced overtime.
It is not just the workplace, but the 
economic structure as a whole that creates 
individuals who are unable to participate in 
long-term loving relationships. The central 
economic program of the New Right is a 
return to the competitive marketplace. It does 
not take too much argument to help show 
people that it is this very spirit of competition 
that creates people who are unable to fully 
love and trust each other. Schooled from 
earliest times in the message that everyone 
around us is a potential adversary, and 
reconfirmed in this by the constant struggle to 
get ahead in the world of work, most people 
en ter in to  re la tionsh ips scared and 
distrusting. The continual need to keep one's 
distance from other people, to be on constant 
alert for the ways that they will take 
advantage of you, the constant injunction of 
the "common sense" of capitalism to "Look 
out for Number 1" and, in the words of the 
theologian Abraham Joshua Heschel, to 
"Suspect Your Neighbour as Yourself", 
creates a personality type that finds it hard to 
abandon the emotional armour and connect 
in deep and intimate ways.
A first priority in strengthening the family, 
as we have already seen, is to humanise the 
workplace and to undermine the competitive 
dynamics of the economy that create 
character structures in all of us that make 
loving more difficult.
But there are a host of other specific 
institutional supports that can be created for 
family life. One obvious example is an 
adequate system of child care. In the past, 
communities and extended families provided 
the necessary support systems for the raising 
of children. This is much less true today, and 
we need to take community responsibility for 
supporting those people who are raising 
children. Child care must be available both 
th ro u g h  com m unity -con tro lled  cen tres 
(funded both by the community and the large 
corporations who employ us outside the 
ho m e), and  th ro u g h  n e ig h b o rh o o d  
associations developed on a voluntary basis 
and aimed at assisting parents and paying 
attention to the children of the neighborhood 
and their needs.
Strengthening families also requires a host 
of support institutions in the larger 
community. Health services must be freely 
available — and their use cannot be a function 
of anyone's income. Nothing destroys 
families more dramatically than sickness or 
death — and often these can be prevented if 
we have a more rational health system. It is 
precisely in the name of family support that 
we must argue for eliminating the profit from 
health care, and developing a system that is 
based on the real needs of the community. 
Family counselling services should be 
publicly supported so that people who are 
facing tensions can get support before the 
tensions have gotten out of hand. Birth 
control counselling and adequate education 
about the care and rearing of children must be 
given a much higher priority for public 
funding. We want strong families — and 
those are families based on having made a real 
choice about when and under what 
circumstances to bring children into the 
world, and families that have the material and 
spiritual resources to raise their children in a 
loving and supportive way.
Nothing undermines family life more than 
economic insecurity. Unemployment or the 
fear of unemployment creates fears that often 
get expressed in alcoholism, drug abuse, 
family violence, or even crime. Even in the less 
extreme cases these fears manifest in a
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decreased energy for dealing with family 
relationships, less openness to loving contacts 
with others, and more fears about the world; 
Unemployment affects the employed worker 
as well — s/he constantly knows that s/he is 
expendable, and that creates huge tensions 
hat are too often brought home.
Fragmentation
A major contributing factor to the 
dissolution of family life is the fragmentation 
of communities that has been deeply 
accelerated by our economic structure. 
Families are isolated from each other and 
now have few natural support systems to help 
them through moments of crisis or strain. As 
people have been forced to move away from 
their communities of birth in order to find 
new jobs and to escape the decay of cities, 
older ties have broken and extended families 
fragmented. But little has replaced these older 
ties, and people often find that it is difficult to 
form ties to the people who live around them, 
sometimes difficult to even know their 
neighbours. They often communicate in 
superficial ways about their own family lives, 
and get their information about what is really 
happening in others' families more from 
magazines and TV dramatisations than from 
honest communication with their neighbours. 
Because their own personal problems often 
seem more intractable than those that can be 
solved in the 21l/i minute time span that is 
needed for TV people, some viewers come to 
feel that their own problems are worse (and 
they as people are worse) than others around 
them. This can lead to despair and defeatism 
as well as a desire to avoid honest discussion 
w ith theii neighbours. The iso la tion  
increases, and with it the tendency to have no 
outside supports for dealing with family 
tensions. The. usual pattern: long periods of 
covering up the tensions and unhappiness, 
followed by a sudden rupture that may lead to 
family violence, alcoholism, depression, 
separation, or divorce.
It is important to understand that the 
patriarchal family structure that worked in 
the 19th century does not function in the late 
twentieth-century society, and that attempts
to recreate it inevitably backfire and 
undermine family life. Women will continue 
to leave family situations that are oppressive 
to them: this is a development that cannot and 
should not be stopped. So if we want to 
preserve two-parent families, we want to 
ensure that these families provide an equality 
of respect and an equality of power and an 
equality of financial opportunity and 
financial responsibility that are the only 
stable bases upon which long-term intimacy 
can be based.
In this way we must understand the 
movement for equality of power and respect 
fo r w om en re p re se n ts  a fo rce  fo r 
strengthening family life by creating women 
who will insist on the kinds of relationships 
that have real potential for genuine love and 
intimacy. The breakdowns of family life 
through much of the 20th century in the US 
has often been based on the following pattern: 
women who were forced into subordinate and 
unrespected roles in the family, slowly 
building up resentment and anger that were 
nowhere legitimated until the stress of this 
situation broke through, either in behaviours 
that were labelled "hysteria" or "depression" 
or "psychosis", or in resentful actions that got 
them labelled as "bitchy" or "self-centred", or 
in leaving the family and seeking divorce. It 
would be not only morally incorrect but 
practically unworkable to try to save the 
family by convincing women to accept this 
subordination and growing to like it. If two- 
parent families are to work, they will do so 
because this destructive dynamic has been 
removed, because women have gained real 
equality of power and respect, at work and 
home.
But it is important to emphasise that it is 
nor in the name of unrestricted individual 
rights that we make this argument. Rather, it 
is because we share with many people ol all 
shades of the political spectrum the 
fundamental belief that a truly human vision 
is one that is based on the mutual inter­
connectedness and mutual dependency and 
mutual love between people that we then 
proceed to argue for those changes that could 
make these kinds of relationships possible.
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It is for the same reason that we insist that 
children be treated with respect in families. 
Not out of some commitment to "individual 
rights" as the highest value, but out of an 
understanding that truly loving relationships 
cannot be compelled and rarely emerge out of 
force or power plays. It is precisely when 
children feel most respected that they are 
most able to give the kind of energy and 
enthusiasm to their families that make 
families work best. We do not mean to imply 
here that equality of respect requires equal 
power in decisions for children. What it does 
require is that when limits and restrictions are 
placed on children, they are explained in ways 
that are appropriate to the development level 
of the child, with a full communciation to the 
child of the respect and love that are 
ingredients in the placing of those limits. It 
also requires the opportunity for children to 
express their feelings, including negative 
feelings, about the situations they are facing 
in their family life.
Single-parent families
Support for family life does not mean only 
support for two-parent families. Single­
parent families, extended families, gay 
families, and • kinship systems are also an 
important focus of our support. Wherever 
people are making the kind of long-term 
emotional and financial commitment to each 
other to take care of each other and provide 
ongoing love and intimacy we have the 
development of a family arrangement. There 
can be no enshrining of the "nuclear family" as 
the only appropriate form — though it is a 
form that may still work for many people and 
should be respected as such.
On the other hand, we must avoid any 
tendency to suggest that people who are single 
are somehow to be blamed or put down for 
not being in a perm anen t prim ary  
relationship. The collapse of long-term 
relationships, as we argue throughout this 
article, is more often a function of the social 
and economic conditions in which we live 
than in any defect or moral fault of the 
individuals involved. One of the worst aspects 
of rightwing propaganda about the family has
been the way that it has seemed to suggest that 
people were making evil choices if they did 
not remain in a family. On the contrary, we 
insist that women who leave oppressive 
marriages after unsuccessfully struggling to 
change them are making a valid and correct 
choice and that none of our support for the 
family is meant to suggest that they should 
rethink that choice.
On the other hand, we must also avoid the 
tendency to suggest that the current 
developm ent of sing le-paren t fam ilies 
represents a higher form of evolution or a very 
good alternative for most of the people 
involved. We hold that long-term loving 
relationships between adults are a more 
fulfilling way for human beings to be, and that 
the unavailability of non-oppressive and 
realisable options for this alternative is a 
tragic reality of this society.
Not surprisingly, the single-parent form is 
one that most completely fits the needs of the 
existing social arrangements. At a previous 
stage in development the patriarchal family 
seemed to play this function, not only 
rep roducing  lab o u r pow er but also 
reproducing the authoritarian forms of social 
interaction that would mirror the world of 
work. But today, the single-parent family fits 
the needs of social control even better. On the 
most obvious level, single women find that the 
combination of stress at work and trying to 
keep a family together without even the 
minimal supports of another parent often 
depletes them of time and energy that might 
be potentially used for political activity or 
trade union participation. Without a second 
income to buffer against possible job loss or 
the incursions of inflation, it becomes all the 
more difficult to maintain the militancy of 
struggle at one's job. Moreover, without 
another parent to provide a ready source of 
emergency baby-sitting, single parents are all 
the more thrown into dependence upon the 
television as baby-sitter of last resort, with a 
corresponding increase of penetration by the 
larger economy into the consciousness and 
daily struggles of one's family. Nothing could 
fit better the needs of the larger economy.
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There is a more subtle level in which this is 
true as well. While there are still some sectors 
of the work force that are kept in line by direct 
authoritarian control on the work floor, 
labour militancy is increasingly undermined 
by the workers themselves who are 
encouraged to internalise feelings about 
themselves that make them feel powerless.
The family, in all its many forms, is the key 
institution for passing on the accumulated 
heritage of our humanity, our wisdom, our 
loving, and our passions. Because it is critical 
to the lives of most of us (even those who do 
not see themselves as currently in a "family" 
often spend much of their psychic energy 
trying to resolve issues that were raised in 
their families of origin), we cannot simply 
abandon this terrain to the right and its 
cynical attempts to manipulate the issue for
their own partisan gain.
Our concern about the family comes from 
an understanding that it is an important part 
of our humanity, and that the attachment that 
most people feel to it is based in part on their 
hopes for the future, their vision of what a 
good life could be, and their commitment to 
giving to their children the best that they can. 
Our interest in families is not merely 
instrumental in terms of dealing with the mass 
psychology of the right, but also flows from a 
deep understanding of the pivotal role that 
families play in the transmission of values and 
vision to the next generations. Because of this 
stewardship for the future, we have to fight 
for the best and most liberatory vision of what 
family life can be, and to fight for those 
changes in the society that could make that 
vision actual.
Within the ambit o f  the general discussion on the topic, Margo Moore, Judy Mundey and 
Joyce Stevens in "Changing the Family, Changing our Politics" present a somewhat different 
point o f  view to that expressed in "Bringing It A ll Back Home”.
C h a n g in g  th e  F a m i l y ,  
C h a n g in g  o u r  P o lit ic s
by Margo Moore, Judy Mundey and Joyce Stevens
Australia is in the process of an economic 
re stru c tu rin g  which is th row ing  up 
tremendous problems and dislocations in 
people 's  lives. The presen t ra te of 
unemployment, homelessness, high rents and 
interest rates, and the threat of a severe 
depression, the lack of amenities and social 
services in the new boom towns are just some 
of these problems. Politically, government is 
supporting the new capitalist development 
and withdrawing what little social support 
there is. Ideologically, the withdrawal of 
social support systems is being justified by 
blaming the breakdown of the traditional 
family for such problems as violence, 
homelessness, inability to get work and 
emotional instability.
Since the breakdown of the family is said to 
be the cause of such problems, obviously the 
capitalist solution must lie in reconstituting 
and strengthening family structures so that 
private profit can be maximised and social 
responsibility in such areas as education, 
health, child care, care of the aged and 
disabled, transport, etc., can be shifted back 
into the family at the expense, mainly, of 
women.
While the economy is not the final 
determinant of changes in personal and 
family relationships, these two structures 
intersect and help to shape one another. 
Powerful vested interests in the hierarchies of 
churches and the political right have long 
been the moral guardians and defendants of
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the traditional family and they become more 
virulent and combative at times when 
economic and social dislocation might lead 
people to search for more radical solutions to 
difficulties in the public and private spheres of 
life.
In 1931, w ith  ra p id ly  ex p a n d in g  
unemployment and a sharp decline in fertility 
rates, the Sane Democracy League called for 
the Australian public to "put on all the 
armour of God to wage the fight in defence of 
religion, home and family against the 
communisf menace". Today's Right to Life, 
Festival of Light and Santamarias use, as a 
central pivot in their struggle against the left, 
a similar call to defend the family. Because of 
the inroads made by feminism and fertility 
control, they add to their crusade the defence 
of "the unborn child".
While most people on the left can perceive 
the reactionary politics of Santamaria's 
general analysis, it is still easy to be tempted to 
view the right's pro-family politics as the 
expression of the real needs of people based 
on their discontent with the dehumanising 
and degrading aspects of daily life. There is a 
desire for security and warmth in personal 
relationships and it is all too easy to think that 
this is realisable within the traditional family.
Any analysis of the relationship between 
men and women, the structure of the family 
and the ideological practices which take place 
within it in advanced capitalist countries, 
m ust qu ickly  com e up against the 
fundamental inequalities which exist between 
men and women, and the oppressive power 
relationships which stem from them and 
which are reflected in all aspects of our lives. 
No structure, including the family, can 
provide for positive human needs and values 
unless this oppression is attacked and 
overcome.
The oppression of women is an essential 
element in the structure of the traditional 
family and contributes to the needs of capital 
at work as well as at home. Any socialist 
transformation of society, then, must involve 
a fundamental change in the nature of the 
family as we currently understand it.
In this article we are attempting to look at 
some of the ideological practices in the family 
which help to produce and support prevailing 
sex, race and class practices, particularly as 
they relate to attempts at economic 
restructuring, and at some of the suggestions 
about how the left might respond to the fears 
and crises that are evident today in family and 
personal life.
Family and class
The family does not, of course, exist 
independently of other social relations but it 
is beyond the scope of this article to address in 
detail the effects of class on family structures 
and practices. It is also difficult to present a 
clear picture of what the "ideal" Australian 
family looks like. If we could rely on the 
media and advertising it would consist of a 
man and woman with two children, living in 
their own home in the suburbs, with the 
woman giving at least a part of her life to 
fulltime housework and child care. Yet, even 
in the 1950s, when a "home in the suburbs" 
became a reality for large numbers of working 
class people, the house and accompanying 
commodities were only made accessible by 
the involvement of increasing numbers of 
married women in the paid workforce.
By 1975-76, two-parent families where a 
mother stayed home fulltime with dependent 
children represented only 20 percent of all 
Australian families, and less than half of all 
families with dependent children. In over 50 
percent of Australian families there were no 
dependent children, and there were more two- 
income families than single ones. (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics)
The changed economic status of many 
women inside and outside the family that this 
reflects has also been accompanied by some 
loosening of patriarchal structures in the 
family, particularly in those where women's 
educational and economic status are more 
viable. The right focusses on these factors and 
the small measure of control that women have 
gained in- the areas of reproduction and 
sexuality to assert that these are the basic 
causes of disruption and dissatisfaction in the 
family and personal life.
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They choose to ignore the fact that the 
"ideal" family is not accessible to most 
without the involvement of women in paid 
work, that past sources of "individual 
satisfaction" within the family have been 
founded on a sexual division of labour which 
still informs family practices and comes into 
s h a rp  c o n t r a d ic t io n  w ith  w o m en 's  
participation in paid work. This division of 
labour is a base, and a powerful source of 
dissatisfaction and disunity in personal 
relations as well as in the arena of public 
activity and politics.
The sexual division of labour 
and sexism in the family
Historically, the roles of men and women 
within the family have ’been linked with the 
part women play in reproduction, though this 
fact alone does not explain why men's work in 
the outside world has come to be more highly 
valued than that of women in child rearing, 
housework and nurturing. The division of 
labour in the family, however, now seems to 
many people to be founded on some natural 
urge on the part of women to nurture and be 
mothers, and fpr men to go into the 
wilderness and perform valiant feats. These 
ideas have given rise to a view of what 
constitutes maleness and femaleness that 
pervades everyday practices, culture and 
ideology.
Men, therefore, are supposedly strong, 
competitive, aggressive, born adventurers 
and explorers, rational and unemotional and 
fitted for work in the outside world. In 
striving to fulfil their preordained destiny 
most men fit neatly into the competitive, 
acqu isitive roles in p ro d u c tio n  and 
consumption that help to keep capitalism 
functioning, even at times when it is being 
torn apart by its own contradictions. Work 
becomes an essential part of maleness so that 
unemployment is not only a financial disaster 
for many, but an emotional and psychic crisis 
which hinders political and social solutions to 
this problem. While unemployment grows, 
many men will work long hours for high pay, 
sometimes at the behest of high mortgage 
rates and other repayments, but always,
Silkscreen poster (1975) produced by See Red, a 
London women's poster group.
ostensibly, in the interests of "the family".
In fact, these practices cast women and 
children into a world of their own, or one 
where contact with father or husband is 
mediated by the mateship of work, sport and 
alcohol. Thus, struggles for a shorter work 
week are not seen as a way to help overcome 
unemployment or expand personal life, but as 
an opening to more overtime. Where militant 
delegates, eg, in the Pilbara, agitate for 
shorter hours, and it appears to threaten this 
"work ethic", they suffer defeat, while 
personal life becomes more and more 
restricted, violent and in crisis.
The focusing of men's lives into the arena of 
public life and away from effective contact 
with nurturing and child care expands men's 
potential for violence and aggression. While 
economic and other social factors contribute 
to violence in our society, the separation of 
male socialisation from nurturing and child 
care (which appear to be the most effective 
areas at present for developing practices of 
concern for the welfare of others) increases 
male violence and rape, particularly within 
the family.
Women, on the other hand, are supposedly 
weak, submissive, inward looking and caring, 
born mothers, irrational and emotional and 
fitted for work in the family circle. If they go 
outside to paid work this is also related to
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their functions in the family so that the sexual 
division of labour is extended into paid work.
For the nearly 43 percent of married 
women who are in the paid workforce, this 
means two jobs and, for most women, a 
lifetime of caring for others at home and at 
work who, in return, are often violent, 
sex u a lly  ag g ressiv e , and e m o tio n a l 
unsupportive. W hile "m otherhood" is 
extolled as the foundation of civilisation, 
women are expected, and many accept, that 
they will be the "power behind the throne" 
rather than actor centre stage. So that, even 
when women enter paid work, many continue 
to see themselves as mainly responsible for 
personal relations and unable to act in public 
life, and part-time work is seen as an 
increasingly appropriate resolution of their 
difficulties. This is reinforced by a labor 
movement and political parties which refuse 
to acknowledge the direct connections 
between the problems in public and personal 
life, and where issues such as child care and 
fertility control are never "mainstream" 
politics. Also, in both public and private life, 
women have lacked the support systems and 
nurturing that make public life tenable. While 
women have provided these supports for men, 
no one but the women's movement has 
provided it for women.
Those who extol traditional family life are 
often the same people who blame women for 
fam ily  b reak d o w n s and  the soc ia l 
consequences. Yet big changes have taken 
place in socialisation which make it 
impossible for the individual family to 
provide the living skills necessary for a 
modern world. Child-care centres, schools 
and peer groups have made enormous 
changes in fam ily re la tions. T oday 's 
electronic media — TV, radio and records — 
exert an influence and occupy more time than 
most family interactions. They enjoy a large 
space in child-rearing and are new avenues for 
the promotion of values which support 
capitalism and patriarchy.
While many women go into paid work 
because of economic difficulties, and some 
would prefer to stay at home, changes in the 
family have made fulltime family life an even
more unrewarding and damaging experience 
for many women and children. These 
difficulties won't be resolved unless policies 
are advanced that strike at the basis of the 
unequal sexual relations inside and outside 
the traditional family.
Individualism
Most psychological theories view people as 
primarily egocentric, and focus on the 
development of individual egos. In such a 
theory the relationship of mother to child in 
the formation of a new individual is of 
paramount importance. There is little 
emphasis on the examination of people as 
social animals who are subjected to a complex 
cultural structure within which they have a 
clearly defined place. There is much emphasis 
on such instinctual drives as "bonding", 
"maternal attachment", etc.
The isolation of children in the family, 
often alone with their mothers for the first 3-5 
years of life, severely restricts their ability to 
form close social ties with a number of people. 
It forms a basis for the isolation and 
separateness many people feel in society while 
at the same time providing the only 
theoretical model for overcoming such 
isolation.
On the surface, then, the family may be seen 
as a collective response to individual 
loneliness in dealing with the world.
It is seen, not only as a retreat from the 
harsh realities of the outside world, but also as 
a place where people can have control over 
their lives, unlike at work. In reality, the 
authoritarian nature of relationships in the 
family and the sexual oppression of women 
by men mean that control in the family (as in 
the workplace) is enjoyed mainly by the most 
powerful. This has produced enormous 
c o n f lic ts  betw een p eo p le  in th o se  
relationships, so that their dreams of security 
and self-realisation cannot be achieved. The 
increasing frustration thus produced means 
that the family, rather than being a retreat, 
helps to produce personal violence, especially 
against women and children.
The forms of control within the family from
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The "romantics" of the eighteenth century 
advocated "love" and "equality" between 
women and men as the foundation of 
marriage at a time when a sharper division 
between public and private life was taking 
place. While this had progressive aspects, its 
success rested on an idealised concept of 
motherhood and the possibilities for personal 
and sexual fulfilment within monogamous 
marriage. It gave rise to ideas such as 
"somewhere there is the right person for you", 
that man and woman as individuals are 
incomplete until joined together and that 
"somehow things will work out".
The "success" of romantic love in marriage 
in fact rested on sexual double standards and 
the giving over of women to the domain of 
domesticity as their fulltime occupation, 
though this has never been fully realised in all 
working-class families. The romanticising of 
love has obscured the difficulties and poten­
tial that exist in all freely chosen personal 
relationships if they are formed between 
equals free of economic and sexual coercion.
father to mother to children also stress the 
individual and authoritarian rather than the 
collective and co-operative. The privatisation 
of personal relationships and institutions .... 
my wife, my children, my house.... provides a 
distorted mirror image to the private 
ownership of the means of production.
The myth of the family as a private d omain 
where real choices and decisions can be made 
supports the arguments that public money 
should not be spent on such things as child 
care or health, and make it difficult for people 
to fight for these things as their right.
Romantic love
The notion of marriage based on romantic 
love is a relatively modern concept, appearing 
in British history in the middle of the 
eighteenth century. Up till then, marriage had 
been based on the widely-held view that any 
two people of similar class and cultural 
background might form lasting personal 
relationships.
Political Responses to the Family 13
It also blurs the fact that fulfilment in 
personal life depends, to a large extent, on 
other economic and social factors such as the 
possibilities for personal enjoyment in paid 
work and leisure. The failures in personal life 
that come from economic and social 
d is c r im in a tio n , a u th o r i ta r ia n is m  and 
alienation at work can thus be made to look as 
though they are the failures of "romance" and 
"love", ie, individual failings.
Romance and love are also seen as women's 
payment for child-rearing and the nurturing 
of men. M otherhood is romanticised so that 
many women see it as their life's purpose 
while this expectation in today's shifting 
world moves further and further from real 
experiences.
The media exploits and reinforces these 
ideas in passive fantasies such as the 
M arlboro Man, Star Wars and the images 
of women in advertising. This not only affects 
the way we behave in our personal life, but 
contributres to passivity in public life and 
romanticised solutions such as "when the time 
is right a great leader will appear".
Sexuality
As we are not born with a formed sexuality 
but have it shaped in the family and in 
interaction with social practices outside the 
family, sexuality reflects the ideas of 
individualism, romanticism and sexism.
The effect of this is that the dominant ideas 
about sexuality and eroticism are directed 
to w ard s  m ale -d e fin ed  p leasu re  and 
reproduction, long past the time when birth 
control could make it independent, and when 
knowledge about women's sexuality has 
established that their sexual pleasure is not 
necessarily connected to penis penetration. 
The sexual objectification of women, their 
exclusion from male networks, sexual 
harassment and the threat of rape form 
effective barriers to equal participation in 
public and private life.
The recognition of homosexuality, and 
particularly lesbianism, challenges traditional 
attitudes to men's control of sexuality. Shared
knowledge about female sexuality also 
provides the possibilities for political struggle 
inside heterosexual relationships.
Because, however, of unrecognised and 
unresolved conflicts in people's sexual lives, 
sexuality is promoted in an unrealistic way 
which divorces it from other social 
re la tio n sh ip s . T hus, m any  p eo p le 's  
expectations founder on a search for a sexual 
and personal life that is perpetually orgasmic 
and "exciting".
While the development of more reliable (if 
still not safe) contraceptives has produced the 
promise of an extended eroticism in the lives 
of women and men, this comes into conflict 
with the "boredom" many experience in 
ongoing monogamous relationships. The 
commercialisation and sale of sex and 
eroticism as commodities, however, provides 
no acceptable alternative for most women 
and many men who strive for sexual 
relationships that have some ongoing and 
permanent component. Pornography and 
violent sex, which dehumanises women and 
sexuality, is offered to a mainly male audience 
while romanticised love in marriage (Mills 
and Boon et al) to a mainly female one. While 
these ideas play a large part in structuring 
people's relationships, personal life for many 
will remain in crisis.
These contradictions within the family do 
not mean that there can be no place where 
personal relationships might be developed or 
where children could be nurtured in a 
supportive framework. Many people feel 
understandably terrified at the idea that life 
might promise little else but the workplace (or 
dole cheques) and personal loneliness. A 
significant minority have already moved out 
of the traditional family structures into child 
and job sharing, communal living, house 
sharing and homosexual households, while 
many more continue the struggle to reshape 
relations within the traditional family. 
Perhaps the historical tenacity of the family in 
its many forms is not only an expression of the 
need for satisfying personal relationships and 
nurturing, but also suggests that it may be an 
essential venue for the struggle to resolve 
contradictions between the needs of the
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individual and those of the wider community. 
However, solutions which leave untouched, 
or shore up, the economic and sexual 
oppression of women, and the division of 
labour in public and private life, will be at best 
temporary and, in the long-run, create even 
greater conflicts even though the shapes that 
familial relationships may take in the future 
are far from clear.
It is, however, constructive to note that the 
current rightwing offensive is an attempt (too 
often effective) to make up ground lost to 
them during the 1960s and '70s. During these 
years there were big changes in attitudes 
towards a wide range of social practices. 
Forms of control were not only challenged in 
the family, but also in the school, at the 
workplace, in the community at large and in 
relations with the environment. For a short 
while, the attention of the Whitlam 
government to schemes such as the Australian 
Assistance Plan reflected demands for 
decentralised forms of control which also 
tackled grassroots problems. Such changes in 
traditional forms of authority and control are 
not made without dislocation and always 
bring forth sharp reactions from the right.
Yet "dislocation" and "disruption" — 
workers' participation and control of 
industry, student and parent involvement in 
non-authoritarian public education, the 
challenge to traditional practices within the 
family, and a control of the environment not 
designed  fo r g ross e x p lo i ta t io n  by 
multinationals — are all part of the struggle 
for a socialist alternative and changed 
priorities in the economic sphere. If the right 
is able to extend conservatism  and 
authoritarianism as a way out of the present 
social and personal difficulties, then the 
socialist movement will be further weakened.
The left and labor movement are 
vulnerable on these questions because many 
.of their policies remain pious words on paper, 
and because many of the men who could help 
change the priorities benefit from the labour 
of women at home, in union offices, and in 
segregated areas of the paid workforce.
The right plays on this vulnerability by 
trying to separate the practice of traditional 
authority in the family from practices in other 
areas. But they realise only too well that the 
ideology which supports control there 
extends into other areas of political practice.
The resolution of contradictions that today 
tear personal relationships apart depends on a 
strong and active women's movement, and 
the left showing, in practice, their concern for 
problems in personal life. Campaigns for 
shorter work hours need to be accompanied 
by demands for shared housework and child 
care. Lack of employment for women in 
developing areas, alongside of unlimited 
overtime for men, can be attacked as 
detrimental to all forms of personal 
relationships. Attacks by the right on 
women's access to safe contraception and 
abortion is a priority issue and the recent 
defeat of a pro-abortion policy in the ACO A a 
defeat for the whole left.
Community programs directed towards the 
problems of child care, the aged, the 
handicapped, with shared community control 
can also challenge traditional forms of 
control while tackling everyday problems. 
The linking of demands for control at the 
workplace with control over community 
activities, consumer involvement in health 
and education programs can all form a 
constructive response to rightwing attacks 
and point towards a socialist alternative for 
Australia.
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A Policy Statement of the 
Commission for Justice and Peace
In a recent issue (No. 78, December 1981), ALR summarised and commented upon a federal 
parliamentary exchange between the Minister fo r  Defence, Jim Killen, and Leader o f  the 
Opposition Bill Hayden, on US bases in Australia, and the nuclear war danger. Following the 
continuing discussion and debate, in this issue ALR publishes an important policy statement o f  
the Australian Catholic Commission fo r  Justice and Peace on world disarmament.
In this statement the Catholic Commission draws attention to the ever-present possibility o f  
nuclear war, the Church's opposition to nuclear weapons and the need fo r  Christians to w orkfor 
the prevention and, finally, the ending o f  w ar. In particular, the statement draws attention to the 
dangers o f  any public willingness to countenance "limited" or "theatre” nuclear war.
It also calls fo r  concerted action by community groups, especially Church groups, to work to 
change the arms-policy stances o f  governments ands their allies as part o f  the growing people's 
movement in many countries fo r  disarmament and peace.
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The ever-present possibility of nuclear war 
calls for reflection on the consequences of 
such an event and the realisation that the kind 
of nuclear war for which countries possessing 
nuclear weapons have prepared themselves is 
immoral.
The use of nuclear weapons, then, and the 
threats they pose to large, non-combatant 
population centres through
massive retaliation directed at cities
escalation towards indiscriminate 
bombing which a limited nuclear 
m i l i t a r y  e n g a g e m e n t  w o u ld  
encourage
collateral destruction of population 
centres which would be unavoidable 
in any purely military exchange, and
the medium and long-term effects of 
nuclear war beyond the borders of 
combatant states and on succeeding 
generations
lays the basis for indiscriminate and 
uncontrollable nuclear war.
Church condemns nuclear weapons
Such a war will involve the killing of 
innocent civilians 011 a scale which will be 
measurable in tens and hundreds of millions. 
Accordingly the Church cannot condone as a 
legitimate means of national defence the use 
of nuclear weapons in the manner in which 
the supeipowers have prepared for their use. 
Recent thinking in the Church is towards the 
rejection of any use.
Further, the declared intent to use such 
weapons is also immoral as it involves making 
population centres hostages in the power play 
among the world's military powers.
It is therefore an urgent moral necessity for 
world leaders to divest their countries of 
nuclear weapons and to work to contain their 
spread. The questions of the legitimacy of a 
particular war and that of a particular method 
of waging war are separate. The abolition of 
wo- •> obvious goal which Christians must 
work towi»rds. The Second Vatican Council 
itself maintained the right of nations to
legitimate defence. We need to eliminate the 
belief, however, that the possession of a 
nuclear arsenal is necessary or proper for 
legitimate defence.
Those responsible for the defence of 
nations must be brought to face the terrible 
possibilities inherent in a system of nuclear 
deterrence. Christians ought to be a pressure 
group joining with others in making it plain to 
national leaders that this urgent moral 
question will not go away: that the political 
will is there, among ordinary people, to make 
nuclear disarmament, and, finally, the 
abolition of war, a possibility.
Taking risks
The search for an acceptable method of 
disarmament will require the slow and careful 
building of trust among leaders and nations. 
It also involves a certain amount of risk — as 
all trust does. A realistic and politically 
possible method of working towards 
d isarm am ent is an agreem ent ab o u t 
reductions in the arms stockpiles and systems 
of the two superpowers. Because of the need 
to establish and build on trust, these 
agreements must be step-by-step. Because of 
the need to build up a climate of trust among 
people, they ought to be mutual agreements. 
The aim of such agreements ought to be the 
abolition of nuclear weapons as a first step 
towards total disarmament. There have been 
several suggestions for such step-by-step 
mutual agreements. Two which merit 
consideration are:
a) a resumption of the Strategic Arms 
Limitations Talks (SALT). These talks have 
been stalled since the failure of the US to 
ratify the SALT II Treaty. It must be 
admitted, however, that they provide the only 
workable basis so far devised which offers any 
hope of eventual disarmament. They have not 
brought about a halt to the arms race, but 
they have contributed, even if modestly, to a 
lessening of the pace of the arms race. If the 
SALT talks are resumed, they will need to be 
vigorously prosecuted and conducted with 
the sense of urgency which the situation 
demands.
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They will need to break the cause-and- 
effect patterns of the arms race between the 
superpowers. They will need to have as their 
final aim total nuclear disarmament, not, as 
has been envisaged in negotiations to date, 
mere economies within the context of a 
slightly less frantic arms race;
b) large-scale, across-the-board reductions 
in the strength of the nuclear arsenals. Such a 
proposal was recently aired by G. Kennan, 
former US Ambassador to the USSR, who 
proposed (M ay, 1980) th a t the US 
government ought to consult with Congress 
and propose to the Soviet Government a 50 
percent across-the-board reduction in nuclear 
weapons by both superpowers, a reduction to 
be applied to all weapons systems and types 
and to be verified by existing means. Second 
and subsequent rounds of reductions could 
then be aimed at, building on the basis of the 
trust engendered by the accomplishment of 
the first round.
Such a method of disarmament cannot 
come about in today's climate of distrust and 
fear unless the process can be started again by 
means of a bold initiative able to break 
through the effects of current distrust, 
cynicism and despair. As a means of bringing 
about a start to the process, one of the 
superpowers should consider establishing its 
bona fides by taking a unilateral step in 
divesting itself of one non-obsolete weapons 
system. Establishing an atmosphere of trust 
involves, as was pointed out, some risk!
World poverty
It is becoming more and more apparent 
that the arms race involves moral questions 
apart from war. The level and pace of 
armaments in the world today — both nuclear 
and conventional — constitutes a massive call 
on the world's limited resources and income. 
There is enough food to feed everyone in the 
world today, and to feed them well. There is 
enough income produced to ensure that the 
basic needs of all the world's population are 
taken care of.
The basic reason why people go without 
food, shelter, housing, education and work is
because of a complex of economic and 
political systems reaching beyond national 
borders, which effectively exclude the 
majority of the world's population from 
participating in their own development, and 
condemn a large minority of these (some 
800,000,000) to the borderline of human 
existence.
One of these international systems which 
contributes to poverty and starvation is the 
arms race. At its present size it constitutes a 
gross and unacceptable drain on resources 
which could be used to build a just world 
order — one in which the needs of the poor 
could be met. The world's poor have a right to 
have their basic needs met. The fact that so 
many do not is an indictment on world 
governmental systems and national priorities 
which countenance this deprivation.
Related to the above is the fact that the 
arms race creates unjustifiable demands on 
the allocation of the world's resources. These 
are limited and the fact that so many go into 
the production and maintenance of the arms 
systems means that they are not available for 
productive use. It also means that the 
superpow ers utilise resources on an 
enormously larger scale than the majority of 
countries — resources of minerals, energy and 
skilled people — resources that are needed in 
a world that is interdependent, for the 
development of the whole world.
Where does Australia fit in all this?
Australia, of course, is not a superpower. It 
has no nuclear deterrent and has signed the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Yet 
Australia has a role, and an important one, to 
play in the question of world disarmament. 
Australia is a major supplier of natural 
uranium. It has some 20-25 percent of the 
Western world's uranium reserves and, 
because of its strategic position, is able to 
influence (through the agreements it works 
out with customer governments) the use of 
these materials. Australia has used its 
influence" on some significant occasions, 
notably in specifying the conditions under 
which customer governments can reprocess
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nuclear materials. Australia is challenged to 
do more, specifically regarding disarm­
ament.
Australia, as was pointed out above, is a 
signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT). It only exports uranium to co­
signatories. The treaty formally commits 
signatories to refrain from developing nuclear 
weapons of their own. In consideration of 
this, the countries which possess a nuclear 
capacity undertake to share such technology 
for peaceful uses, especially  pow er 
generation. But the NPT has another side to it 
which is not sufficiently emphasised. The 
powers which possess the nuclear deterrent 
are supposed to commit themselves to arms 
control. That they have not done so with 
sufficient seriousness is attested in the refusal 
of the non-aligned countries to sign any joint 
communique at the Second NPT Review 
Conference in 1980. Undoubtedly, this lack of 
commitment to arms control weakens the 
NPT which is the only mechanism the world 
has at the moment to contain the spread of 
nuclear weapons and to share nuclear 
technology.
It is not only logical, but imperative, for 
Australia to match its laudable concern for 
restricting the use of exported uranium with 
an equal concern for arms control. The lack of 
progress in the latter is imperilling the future 
of the Treaty upon which so much depends.
Australia has a certain role to play in the 
American military system. Additionally, 
Australia is committed militarily to the US 
through treaty arrangements. This gives 
Australia some leverage with the US 
government to promote weapons control with 
a view to disarmament. It should use its good 
offices with the US to do this.
The education of the public is a necessary 
step which should accompany international 
action for disarmament because much 
depends on the political will of an informed 
public. Indeed, disarmament will not be 
possible until there is sufficient demand from 
ordinary men and women to make it come 
about. To this end, we have advocated in the 
past and advocate again the setting up of a
Peace Research Institute to monitor the 
degree of militarisation in the region and 
internationally, and to educate the public in 
the dangers of nuclear war and the steps 
which need to be taken to prevent it. Such an 
institute should be funded by the federal 
government as an expression of its 
commitment to world peace. (The Secretary 
General of the UN suggests that governments 
allocate 0.1 percent of their military budgets 
to peace education. This would be nearly 
$3,000,000 in Australia.)
We have been concerned to spell out what 
are clearly non-legitimate means of defence 
and to assert the corresponding duty of 
national leaders and ordinary citizens to seek 
to actively promote disarmament, both in our 
region and further afield, especially between 
the superpowers.
None of what has been said above negates 
the right, the duty, even, of a country to 
defend itself by legitimate means.
Concerted action
There is a great deal of despair in the 
community about the failure to make 
progress towards nuclear disarmament. 
While it is true that many of the factors 
governing the arms race are outside the 
control of the individual, it must not be 
overlooked that some factors are able to be 
affected by community groups, by people 
prepared to act together to affect the attitudes 
of their fellow citizens, the international 
stance of their governments and the strategic 
policies of their government's allies. History 
has many examples of great international 
scandals (e.g. slavery) which have been 
brought to an end by the sustained activity of 
ordinary men and women prepared to 
commit their time and energies to bringing 
pressure to bear on those who make decisions.
Such pressure is possible in the area of 
disarmament. It requires political will of a 
high order from national governments. This 
will require in turn that all of us shake off our 
despair or lethargy and begin to work with 
others to create a climate, a country, an 
international order of peace.
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The Trade Unions and 
the Media
by Allan Ashbolt
We are living at a time when the Fraser 
government has virtually declared war on the 
unions — class war of a peculiarly vindictive 
kind. And in this war, the government is using 
every propaganda weapon, every propaganda 
outlet it can find. If it succeeds in taming or 
terrorising the union movement, then the 
boundaries of political democracy will shrink 
to negligible proportions. For the union 
movement, despite its backslidings, mistakes
and intra-mural wrangling, remains ttie 
spearhead of democratic action in this 
country and the measure by which democratic 
progress must be judged. Only the union 
m ovem ent, with its m ass base and 
participatory processes, can contain and 
com bat the pervasive power of capital. For 
us, as unionists, the problem always starts 
with capital and specifically with ownership 
and control of the means of production.
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There seem to me to be several basic 
questions here:
(1) who owns the media organisations?
(2) who controls the output in press, radio
and television? (3) what are the consequences 
for the trade union movement particularly, 
and for the cause of social justice generally? 
(4) what strategy should be adopted to deal 
with this whole problem?
The fundamental pattern of media 
ownership in Australia is well enough known, 
and is indeed a matter of some notoriety. 
Disregarding a few maverick publications, it's 
reasonable to say that, at present, three 
groups — John Fairfax Ltd of Sydney, The 
Herald and Weekly Times Ltd of Melbourne 
and the News Corporation Ltd (the Rupert 
Murdoch group) — own nearly all the print 
media: the metropolitan dailies, the weeklies, 
the specialist magazines, various sorts of 
periodicals, and a fair number of provincial 
and suburban newspapers.
In the 1960s, when the union movement 
first looked at this problem seriously, Sir 
Frank Packer's Consolidated Press was still 
a force to be reckoned with, but today his flag- 
carrier, the Sydney Daily Telegraph, is in the 
hands of Rupert Murdoch. The Packer 
group, under Sir Frank's son, Kerry (for 
ow nership  in A ustra lia  tends to be 
concentrated in families), has cut back 
drastically on its newspaper holdings. The 
main print products of the Packer group are 
The Bulletin and The Women's Weekly — 
and just let me mention incidentally that, for 
nearly twenty years, it also had a half-share in 
what was purportedly an ABC publication — 
TV Times. But the group's strongest effort 
now goes into television.
Contraction of ownership
This contraction of ownership over the past 
ten years is hardly surprising. The economic 
push is continually towards monopolisation 
of resources, in order to reduce production 
and distribution costs. In the newspaper 
industry there has been an ever-increasing 
contraction of ownership since around 1900, 
and if Murdoch's 1979 share raid on the
Melbourne Herald had been consummated, 
there would now have been only a Big Two 
(Fairfax and Murdoch), instead of a Big 
Three, It's worth noting, too, that the 
Melbourne Herald survived, mainly because 
of intervention by the Fairfax group, which 
moved in to acquire a 14.7 percent holding. In 
the coming ownership war, Fairfax and the 
Melbourne Herald will probably form an 
alliance on one side, with Murdoch and 
Packer (who are already partners in Lotto), 
on the other side.
What must be realised about the Big Three 
or the Big Four (however you like to 
characterise the situation) is that each has 
an enormously wide spread of ownership. It's 
wide geographically — the Melbourne Herald 
is in every state except New South Wales and 
has been in Papua-New Guinea for years; 
Murdoch's empire stretches beyond Australia 
to New Zealand, Britain and the United 
States, and he has recently bought the 
London Times', the Fairfax group, with its 
fifty-three wholly-owned or partly-owned 
subsidiaries, takes in the Melbourne Age, the 
Macquarie radio network and all-state 
franchise for Muzak, the piped music used for 
pacification purposes in so many offices and 
factories.
The ownership is wide, too, in range of 
outlets, covering not only press, radio and 
television, but numerous associated activities. 
Murdoch's company, for instance, is the sole 
owner of Festival records; Fairfax and the 
Melbourne Herald are in pulp and paper 
manufacturing; the Melbourne Herald has 
long-standing ties with Hoyts Theatres Ltd, 
which has monopolised film distribution and 
exhibition for more than half a century.
The media often tend to be thought of in 
terms of newspapers, and within newspapers, 
of editorial opinion, political analysis and the 
high-minded imparting of information. But 
the interests of the media owners also 
encompass most aspects of what is commonly 
called entertainment — pop music, films 
(Murdoch has recently launched a film 
production company), paperback books, 
sport (as Kerry Packer has so effectively 
demonstrated with his World Series cricket), 
and of course television shows. The media
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companies have become, in fact, multi-media 
conglomerates.
It's also vital to understand that the media 
monopolies are locked into non-media 
business and trade. Fairfax, for instance, is 
closely connected with the Bank of New 
South Wales and the AM P Society; and the 
AMP Society is, in turn, a major shareholder 
in (if we consider only the television stations), 
TCN Sydney, ATV Melbourne, ADS 
Adelaide, TVT Hobart, QTQ Brisbane, BTQ 
Brisbane and TVQ Brisbane. The AMP's 
holding in TVQ Brisbane comes, I might add, 
by way of Brambles Industries Ltd, Pioneer 
Concrete Services Ltd, Ampol Petroleum and 
Arnett Transport Industries. To take another 
example, the Murdoch group owns F.S. 
Falkiner and Sons, the big pastoral company; 
and last year sold its investment in the Alwest 
bauxite venture for a surplus of 15 million 
dollars, bought a half share in Ansett 
Transport Industries, and through Ansett, 
picked up a 15 percent holding in Santos Ltd, 
the South Australian gas and oil producer.
You may recall that, when Ansett, during 
the reign of the now forgotten Sir Reginald 
Ansett, was given the licence for a Melbourne 
television channel, it prompted the question 
from curious observers: why is an airline 
operator in television? Now that Murdoch is 
the joint owner of Ansett, one might just as 
easily ask: why is a media magnate in airlines? 
To which the answer is, in polite capitalist 
jargon: he is diversifying his interests. Or to 
put it more realistically, he is extending his 
financial reach in the cut-throat world of 
monopoly capitalism. And so far he seems, by 
his own standards, not to be doing too badly: 
the two-airline policy looks like being 
abandoned, in favour of deregulation; and the 
Broadcasting and Television Act has been 
changed, so as to allow him the licence for 
the ex-Ansett television station in Melbourne, 
without forcing him to give up Channel 10 in 
Sydney.
That is the world, the world of monopoly 
capitalism, in which the media organisations 
function. That is the world to which the media 
owners belong and from which they derive 
their values. That is the world they have
helped to make, the world they are 
determined to preserve. In that world, it's 
hardly strange that a media magnate is in 
airlines, any more than that non-media 
companies like BHP, the jam  manufacturers 
Henry Jones Ltd, the Swan Brewery, the Bell 
Group and the National M utual Life 
Association are in radio and television, as 
either licence-holders or investors. To convey 
some idea of how crucial the media have 
become to the world of monopoly capitalism, 
I need only list the companies lining up with 
the Packer group in a bid for control of the 
projected domestic satellite system: IBM, 
Conzinc Rio Tinto, the Colonial Sugar 
Refinery, Myer's, Ampol Petroleum, the 
A M P  S o c ie ty , T h o m as N a tio n w id e  
Transport (Murdoch's partner in Ansett), 
Jam es H ard ie Industries , A u stra lian  
Consolidated Industries, and the one 
corporation often ignored in considering 
Australia's media giants — Amalgamated 
Wireless of Australasia (AWA). AWA has 
been a maker and supplier of electronic 
equipment since around 1920, and its 
powerful presence is still to be found in 16 
television stations and 12 radio stations, 
metropolitan and provincial, throughout 
Australia. For the media industry is merely 
p a r t  o f th e  m u ch  m o re  m ass iv e  
communications industry, dominated by 
electrical engineering companies like the 
Radio Corporation of America and Bell 
Telephone in the USA, and by AWA, EMI, 
Email and Philips in Australia.
The role of advertising
The media industry is directly linked to the 
world of monopoly capitalism through 
advertising. One social critic (Humphrey 
McQueen: Australia's Media Monopolies, 
p. 10) has argued, and I think convincingly, 
that the commercial mass media are not "news 
and features backed up by advertising'', but 
are, on the contrary, ''advertisements which 
carry news, features and entertainment in 
order to capture audiences for advertisers". 
Advertisements, we must remember, are the 
main revenue support of newspapers and 
magazines, the sole revenue support of radio 
and television.
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For me, the typical — almost proto-typical
— newspaper is The North Shore Times, one 
of the products in Rupert Murdoch's 
suburban chain. A copy is thrown into my 
garden once a week, free of charge, because 
i t 's  f in a n c e d  a lm o s t  e n t i r e ly  by 
advertisements. Around 85-90 percent of the 
paper is given over to advertisements; the rest 
to gossip, municipal council reports, charities 
and sports results. If you take a benign view of 
The North Shore Times, it could be said to be 
publishing information on the availability of 
goods and services to consumers on Sydney's 
North Shore. But the operative word is 
"consumers". Readers of this paper are 
presumed to be not so much readers as 
potential units of purchasing power. That's 
on a benign view; on a more critical view, the 
purpose of the paper is neither to advance nor 
even to scrutinise the interests of the 
community which it professedly serves, but to 
protect the interests of those traders and 
business companies from whom it draws its 
income.
The revenue accruing to the Sydney 
Morning Herald on an average Saturday is, 
according to the Assistant General Manager 
of John Fairfax Ltd in evidence before the 
Norris Enquiry, one million dollars. In an 
average week, 55 percent of The Bulletin 
consists of advertisements, 45 percent of The 
National Times. On most weekdays the 
proportion in the Sydney Morning Herald is 
about 50 percent; on Wednesdays somewhat 
higher, on Saturdays, higher still. In almost 
any newspaper or magazine, the display 
advertising (as distinct from the classified 
advertising) surrounds, encases and virtually 
imprisons the main body of the news. On 
pages dealing with travel, food, wine and 
automobiles, the advertising often relates in 
kind to the type of material in the news 
columns. Most publications are laid out 
around the ads, built around the ads. The 
craft of sub-editing has declined to the point 
where it's now largely a matter of fitting news 
reports into spaces not taken up with ads. 
Now I'm not suggesting that advertisers 
control the news, either by command or by 
the expression of wishes, or by explicit threats 
and vetoes. What I'm saying is that
advertising provides the economic and 
cultural setting, as well as the physical setting, 
for most newspapers and magazines. One of 
the results is that journalists come very 
quickly and clearly to recognise the 
connection between their earnings and the 
paper's advertising revenue.
In commercial radio and television, where 
the bombardment from ads is intense and 
almost unceasing, many commentators, 
interviewers and actors are now directly 
involved as hucksters in the selling of goods 
and the promotion of big companies. 
Reputedly independent journalists and 
interviewers speak openly on behalf of 
corporations like Esso with a product to sell 
and prestige to  m ain tain . In such 
circumstances, there can be no doubt about 
who tells whom what to say; and no doubt, 
either, that the vaunted independence of these 
journalists has been compromised and 
diminished. But since the President of the 
United States was for some years a television 
spruiker for General Electric, perhaps this 
kind of activity has now been sanctified.
Another alarming phenomenon is that 
advertising has affected the very style of news, 
drama, musical and talk presentation in both 
radio and television. Programs, including the 
news, are constructed around so-called 
advertising breaks, which are not really 
breaks at all. In fact, programs are for the 
most part designed to give a continuity of 
tone, image and pace, so that the advertising 
merges into the news and entertainment.
Advertising is what might be called the 
standard-bearer of the consumer culture, and 
as such it represents one important form of 
control over media content. In speaking of 
control, I'm not referring here to the fact that 
most advertising agencies in Australia are 
American-owned. That's another form of 
control; imperialist control, which I mention 
only in passing. I'm saying rather that, in the 
print media particularly, advertisers help to 
define the market at which a newspaper or 
m a g a z in e  is a im e d . A nd  m a rk e t  
considerations in turn mould the paper's style
— for example, the sort of topics that are 
chosen, the level of understanding that is
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assumed, the sophistication or vulgarity of 
approach. In defence of monopoly, it's 
som etim es a rg u ed  th a t the v a rio u s  
publications within the one organisation 
differ from each other in style. To a small 
extent that's true; but in general there's only 
an appearance of diversity. The differneces in 
style arise primarily from differences in 
market orientation. Remember, I'm not 
contending that advertisers alone decide on 
the market for a publication, I'm contending 
that advertisers help to define the market. 
And definition is a continuing process, 
carried out in conjunction with editors and 
proprietors.
But how, you might ask at this stage, does 
monopoly ownership bear down on the 
employees, particularly on the journalists 
who appear to be responsible for the news 
content in the media? Well, let's examine for a 
moment the structure, the operational 
structure, of media organisations. At the top 
of the pile stand the owners, few in number, 
immense in wealth and power, intent on 
safeguarding their interests. At the bottom 
are the media workers — a heterogeneous 
complex of reporters, printers, film directors, 
layout a r tis ts , scene designers, floor 
managers, film cutters, engineers, script 
assistants, photographers, technicians and 
various other operatives.
In the middle, a hierarchy of managers, 
editors and controllers hold the workers in 
place. The important factor is not who these 
people are, but at the top, what they own, at 
the bottom, what they produce, in the middle 
whose interests they serve. I might add that, at 
the bottom, among the workers, the division 
of labour is quite extreme, thus enabling the 
middle or executive level to exercise a 
considerable degree of control over the 
product. From our viewpoint, as unionists, 
the middle level is the key to the struggle.
I won't suggest that the proprietors, either 
separately or as a cabal, habitually issue 
orders, directions or instructions to the staff 
down below. I won't suggest that they 
deliberately set out to brainwash the public — 
except, say, when trying to get rid of a federal 
Labor government as in 1975, or to flatter the
Premier of New South Wales when the licence 
for Lotto is up for grabs. But I will suggest 
that the proprietors, and the boards which 
they head, decide on the disposition of 
resources, formulate editorial policy in a 
general way and determine the value 
framework in which a newspaper, magazine 
or broadcasting station will operate. And I'll 
suggest, too, that the task of the managers, 
editors and controllers in the middle of the 
structure is to keep that value framework 
intact and untarnished. It's the middle 
managers, representing the interests of the 
proprietors, recruited to protect those 
interests, who comprise the control points 
over journalists and other workers.
What to write
Of course, I'm aware that journalists often 
deny that any explicit control exists. A 
journalist may contend that nobody tells him 
what to write; that nobody gives him orders; 
and that his editor asks only for consultation. 
Whereas he's usually conforming to a value 
framework already impacted in the style, 
policies and objectives of the paper; and he's 
usually  try ing, e ither consciously  or 
unconsciously, to meet the expectations of his 
employer. In short, he's concerned with 
safeguarding and furthering his career in what 
happens to be a very insecure profession; a 
profession that lacks the status of law, 
medicine or even engineering, a profession 
that is tied to the organisational demands of 
the employer, a profession that exists in a 
kind of no-man's-land between academic 
discipline and story-telling.
For myself, I avoid the word "bias" because 
it infers that bias is applied deliberately, like a 
technique. And that isn't always the case. 
Bias is, if anything, built into journalistic 
practice, into day-by-day routines. It emerges 
in decisions about what events deserve to be 
covered, in concepts of what constitutes a 
news story or a news peg, in beliefs about how 
to write according to conventional news- 
value standards, in convictions about how the 
public benefit or the public interest might best 
be served. In my experience, I would not like
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to try counting the number of times accuracy 
has been sacrificed for the sake of a "good" 
story or truth for the sake of "public" benefit.
I don't think we can ignore the fact, either, 
that the manipulation of news by sources of 
influence outside news-gathering institutions 
has become remarkably common during the 
past half-century. There are, for a start, all 
those captains of industry, commerce and 
finance, along with judges, archbishops, vice- 
chancellors and well-heeled conservative 
p o l i t i c i a n s  w ho  c o n d u c t  in - c lu b  
conversations with proprietors and editors, 
and whose views assist in framing what is 
sometimes called the conventional wisdom or 
the  p re v a ilin g  c lim a te  of o p in io n . 
Occasionally they'll intervene quite crudely 
with proprietors and editors to suppress 
information, kill stories or canvass a 
f a v o ra b le  (so m e tim e s  u n fa v o ra b le )  
interpretation of events.
Then there are the lobbyists and public 
relations men who plant stories, fly kites, 
pump in rumour and scandal, offer meals and 
overseas trips as bribes, and shower editorial 
desks with handouts. (The handout is now 
one of the main supports of journalism.) And 
in this account of outside influences we must 
never forget those public servants who offer 
reporters assistance, guidance and coniid- 
ential documents, especially when trying to 
destroy a Labor government.
Indeed, the media are often thought of as a 
battleground for competing interests — the 
interests of those who own the means of 
production, the interests of those who man 
the productive machines and processes, the 
interests of those who buy space and time, the 
interests of those who run our governments, 
the interests of those who seek publicity, the 
interests of those who read and view. It makes 
a nice pluralistic picture, with all these 
contending forces arriving at some sort of 
balance, with truth eventually emerging 
triumphant. But as the historian Lord Acton 
once remarked: "Truth always prevails in the 
end, but only when it has ceased to be in 
someone's interest to prevent it from doing 
so."
As unionists, we know that the economic 
interests of the owners are paramount; and by 
economic interests I mean not just the 
accumulation of profits and investments but 
the maintenance of what they would regard as 
social stability, of conditions out of which 
they can draw both financial power and 
ideological au th o rity . These in terests 
converge with the interests of the advertisers,
. especially the corporate advertisers, and 
shape the career interests, in some cases the 
sheer survival interests of the journalists, 
printers and other workers.
But there's a continuing tension between 
the owners and the workers, a tension that 
springs partly from wage quarrels and the 
efforts of proprietors to cut down on labour 
resources, but even more, I think, from the 
creative, investigative, interpretative nature 
of media work. This tension can be quite 
destructive — the incidence of cynicism is 
fairly high among journalists, for instance — 
but on the constructive side it has also led to 
a significant (though still scattered) resistance 
movement within the industry, a resistance 
movement aimed at giving reporters and 
program-makers more control over what they 
do and how they do it. We must never 
underrate the courage, honesty and skill of 
genuinely conscientious journalists.
The ABC and the state
Nevertheless, the political weighting of the 
entire media, including the ABC, is very much 
to the right. Words like "impartiality", 
"objectivity", "neutrality" and "balance" have 
little meaning when most information flows 
from centres of power and authority with 
financial and ideological interests to protect. 
One of our troubles in Australia is that we 
have been conditioned to think of politics 
within the narrow range of parochial party 
politics. So long as the Labor Party is allowed 
an occasional hearing in the press or on 
television, we console ourselves that 
standards of objectivity have been preserved. 
But achieving a balance of space or time 
between conservative and labor spokesmen is 
not the crux of the problem. The crux is how 
to alter the historical and social frame in 
which events are reported.
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As for the ABC, which I suggested was as 
much to the right as any other media 
organisation, we have to recognise that it is 
not so much a creature of government, 
responsive only to ministerial pressure, as an 
ideological arm of the capitalist state 
machinery, disseminating values, ideas, 
opinions and attitudes which assume or in 
some way illustrate the basic benevolence of 
our social structure, our political processes, 
our foreign alliances, our economic priorities 
and our cultural aspirations. Not that the 
ABC should be regarded as a blunt 
propaganda instrument; its ideological 
purpose is woven much more subtly into 
Australian life. But its essential closeness to 
the capitalist state has been frankly 
recognised in the ABC submission to the Dix 
Committee of Review, a submission which 
calls for "corporate underwriting" of (so far as 
I can gather from the rather murky 
phraseology) costly high culture programs. 
Under this proposal, there would be no hard 
selling of p ro d u c ts , only a discreet 
institutional method of advertising — 
perhaps a lead-in title like "This Week In 
Industry — presented by General Motors- 
Holden", or "The Esso-BHP Play of the 
Week", or "Utah Mining's Concert Classics", 
or "World Affairs — presented by Imperial 
Chemical Industries in conjunction with 
Conzinc Rio Tinto". One can hardly wait for 
the moment.
The ABC is not at present much use to us. 
The ABC's central task since its foundation in 
1932 has been to provide Australia with high 
culture programs, especially in music and 
drama, and with so-called service programs
— education, rural, sporting, religious and 
migrant programs — in other words, 
programs which would be rejected by the 
commercial electronic media as unprofitable, 
yet which the capitalist state considers 
necessary for social health and welfare. The 
ABC has been expected to bring an element of 
bourgeois cultural stability to a situation that 
would otherwise be culturally lopsided and 
chaotic. The ABC was never a countervailing 
pow er to the com m ercials; it is a 
supplementary power, almost a prop. And
whenever the commercials find profit in what 
has traditionally been an ABC area of 
activity, they move in to appropriate it — as 
has occurred, for example, in so much 
televised sport, especially Packer cricket. 
Make no mistake: commercial broadcasting, 
not national broadcasting, is the dominant 
mode of production and, in terms of 
resources, represents the dominant power. In 
totality, the commercial operators have more 
stations and more access to money. All 
broadcasting in Australia functions, socially 
and culturally, in a commercial setting.
The ABC and the commercials
Between the ABC and the commercial 
operators, there's a somewhat uneasy alliance 
based on the understanding that the ABC will 
accept the responsibility for high culture and 
so-called service programming. It's only when 
the ABC steps out of line or out of character, 
either by pulling audiences away from the 
commercials (as in the early days of 2JJ), or 
by disturbing the populace with radical 
thoughts and-raffish language that agitation 
begins among newspaper editorialists and 
media lobbyists against the wasteful 
expenditure of taxpayers' money. The 
commercials resent the intrusion of the ABC 
into what they regard as their bailiwick of 
popular entertainment; they are afraid of the 
ABC's occasional (very occasional these 
days) adventurousness in news and political 
commentary; ancf since the advent of the 
F rase r governm ent, they have been 
determined that the ABC shall no longer take 
the lead in innovative programming. Under 
these conditions, and with commissioners 
who reflect the ideological intentions of the 
Fraser government (the former chairman, 
after all, was for most of his working life, a top 
executive of BHP), it's not at all surprising 
that the ABC should have lately sunk back 
into political orthodoxy, cultural gentility, 
social conformity and intellectual timidity.
So the next time an ABC reporter asks you, 
during a strike: "Aren't you holding the public 
up to ransom?" or "Isn't this victimisation of 
the public?" or "Why do you persist in this 
contempt of arbitral procedures?" — don't be
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surprised. Although the ABC has always 
broadcast specialist or minority culture for 
such disparate sections of the community as 
schoo lch ild ren , fa rm ers, churchgoers, 
migrants, music-lovers and adult education 
enthusiasts, it has never considered the 
working class, or the trade union movement 
in particular, as a section of the community. 
The ABC has seldom made any programs 
which consistently and openly acknowledged 
the existence of the working class or which 
examined in a thorough-going way the social 
relations of production. Is it any wonder that 
young ABC reporters come to you with 
hoary questions like "Aren't you holding the 
public up to ransom?" or "Can the nation 
afford a 35-hour week?" — when they, as 
ABC staff, have for years worked a basic 36 
hour 45 minute week, without asking 
themselves whether the nation could afford it.
Alternative media
This sort of circumstance, where union 
leaders get bailed up with loaded questions, 
might be taken as a model in miniature of our 
problem. How do we ensure, for example, 
that strikes are reported in the context not of 
employer interests but of the struggle foi 
social justice? How do we ensure that union 
views are published not just as fragments of 
an interview but as coherent ideas carrying 
social and historical validity? We could, I 
suppose, launch a daily newspaper — 
although according to an estimate by the 
Assistant General Manager of John Fairfax 
Ltd, the setting up of a newspaper would 
require a capital investment of $50 million. 
But whether 50 million, 5 million or 1 million, 
the point is that we would have to acquire 
tremendous financial and technological 
resources. That's what ownership is largely 
about — th e . ownership of financial and 
technological resources, material resources, 
and exploiting those material resources for 
profit by the use of labour resources. Again, if 
we applied for a television licence in, say, 
Sydney — and by some weird miracle got it by 
ousting one of the existing commercial 
licensees — how would we gather together 
enough financial and technological resources 
in order to run a.station? Would we ask John
Fairfax Ltd for a loan of the Channel 7 
tower, transmitting equipment and studios? 
Or Packer for the loan of Channel 9? Or 
Murdoch for Channel 10?
Moreover, if we were dependent on 
advertising to keep a newspaper or television 
station going, then we would be just another 
adjunct of monopoly capitalism. And this, I 
think, is what has happened to the labor 
movement's radio stations around Australia. 
However valuable they might be for revenue- 
raising, and despite the occasional labor- 
oriented commentary which is broadcast, 
these stations are trapped in the consumer 
whirl as much as any conventional station. 
They follow the predominant programming 
patterns of the commercials and have 
effected little change or innovation. I'm not 
saying that they are incompetently managed; 
on the contrary, their efficiency in competing 
with the commercial outfits is, in a quite 
important sense, compounding our whole 
problem with the media. We can't change 
ways of thinking among the people at large, 
and among journalists in particular, we can't 
change the ruling class frame of political 
reference, by accepting and adhering to the 
values of capitalist commodity culture.
I don't want to end negatively, so let me 
propose a modest method of tackling the 
problem that faces us as a movement. The 
ACTU should, I think, form a media- 
monitoring-and-teaching unit which would 
have these basic tasks: to monitor newspaper, 
radio and television reporting of political 
affairs generally and union affairs in 
particular; to analyse the content of this 
coverage in terms of style, approach and 
political weighting; to publish the results on a 
regular basis and to have the meaning of the 
results discussed at union meetings; to liaise 
with the Australian Journalists Association in 
preparing a more comprehensive and more 
stringent code of ethics, and in seeking more 
autonomy for journalists; to work with 
union members, delegates and officials 
tow ards a closer, m ore im aginative 
understanding of the difficulties and 
challenges facing fellow workers employed by 
the media; to assist union spokesmen in media 
performance and presentation.
The Polish Crisis
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Is there a w a y  out?
WALESA NEGOCIE
by Monty Johnstone and Andreas Westphal
Since World War II  the Polish crisis has been the most open and prolonged social and 
political conflict in what is sometimes called real existing socialism. Debate in and between the 
international communist parties is sharp, particularly between the Communist Party o f  Italy 
and the Soviet Communist Party.
In this issue, ALR reprints part o f  an article published in the January 1982 issue o f  the British 
Communist Party's journal, Marxism Today. Written in November 1981, the article was 
overtaken by events. But parts o f  its analysis bear reprinting even now.
The portion o f  the article ALR is reproducing deals with the need fo r  a social and political 
evolution towards what the authors call an historic compromise. Before the imposition o f  
martial law, things appeared to be possibly moving in that direction. However, this undoubtedly 
difficult and complex process was cut short by the unfolding o f  the second o f  Johnstone and 
Westphal's three scenarios — a Polish army and police clamp down. The authors were among the 
very few  who gave this possibility greater weight than direct Soviet intervention.
Whether military rule can really help to resolve the deep-seated difficulties Poland faces is 
extremely doubtful. More likely, Poland (and ultimately the whole o f  Eastern Europe) will have 
to eventually adopt some form  o f  Johnstone and Westphal's first scenario. Only then would the 
social and political situation in Poland be reflected in the present name o f  the Polish state — 
People's Poland.
The struggles of the Polish workers in the 
summer of 1980 ushered in a new and stormy 
period in their country's history. August 1980 
brought to the surface a long-smouldering 
structural crisis, in which political and 
economic elements are inextricably linked. 
The absence of democratic political structures 
had had disastrous effects on the economy
which it will take many years to overcome.
The Gdansk Agreement of August 31,1980 
recognised the establishment of "new self- 
governing trade unions" as "authentic 
representatives of the working class".1 The 
formation and legal registration of Solidarity 
with its 914 million members — followed by 
that of Rural Solidarity to represent three
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million private farmers — represents 
something qualitatively new and without 
precedent in any socialist country.
Poland is today experiencing a crisis of 
hegemony. The Polish United Workers' 
Party, recognised in the constitution as the 
"leading political force in society in the 
construction of socialism", has committed 
itself to work for democratic renewal but is 
unable effectively to lead the people because it 
does not enjoy their confidence. The decisive 
forces in Solidarity and the Catholic Church, 
which do enjoy such confidence, do not aspire 
to become political parties taking over the 
leadership of the government from the 
PUWP.
In such a siutation, the only hope for 
Poland would seem to lie in a historical 
compromise concluded between the PUWP, 
Solidarity and the Catholic Church to tackle 
the crisis on the basis of genuine socialist 
democracy and along the lines that can win 
the active support of the majority of the 
people.
The political system
The upheavals of 1980, like those of 1956 
and 1970, represented the crisis of a certain 
model of socialism. On each occasion 
working class discontent, denied adequate 
channels of expression, had built up and 
finally burst out in explosions. They brought 
about changes in the Party leadership, 
important concessions and a denunciation of 
bureaucracy and of the autocratic practices of 
the previous Party secretary. Yet on each 
occasion, after a certain period, the pendulum 
swung back again to the same concentration 
of power.
The root of the trouble lies not in the 
character of individuals but in the nature of 
the power structures inherited from the Stalin 
period, within which successive Paity leaders 
operated and enjoyed the corrupting fruits of 
uncontested power. What has been involved 
in Poland, as in other socialist countries, has 
been the subordination of all social and 
political organisations to an unchallengeable 
and irremovable governing Communist
Party. The latter has, by an extension of the 
same process, been effectively subordinated 
to the Political Bureau and sometimes, within 
this, to the First Secretary and a small group 
around him.
The negative effects of this system in 
Poland reflected themselves in arbitrariness 
and growing corruption not only in the 
political sphere but equally in the economy 
subordinated to it. Lack of control from 
below not only deprived the working people 
of the democratic rights with which socialism 
promises to provide them in full measure. It 
also made for economic inefficiency and 
disregard for economic reality in general and 
the subordination of consumer interests and 
social welfare to capital accumulation. It 
deprived both the political system and the 
economy of the feedback mechanisms 
essential for preventing the accumulation of 
abuses, errors and the corruption that became 
so rife at all levels.
The Catholic Church, embracing 80 
percent of the population, has in recent years 
represented an increasingly strong element of 
pluralism in Poland, although it has been 
anxious not to play any directly political role. 
The establishment and legal registration of 
the 9Vi million Solidarity has, however, gone 
far beyond this in its effects on the country's 
effective power structure. It represents an 
e x c e p t io n a l ly  p o w e rfu l p lu r a l i s t ic  
phenomenon unique in the socialist countries.
Whilst repudiating allegations of wishing
to take power, Solidarity is most certainly an 
extremely strong pressure group acting on the 
existing organs of power at all levels and, in 
practice, introducing elements of dual power 
into the Polish political system.
While Solidarity's program resolution 
speaks of examining the need for setting up a 
second self-government or social-economic 
chamber alongside Poland's present single­
chamber parliament (the Sejm) to supervise 
economic policy, "radical" elements in 
Solidarity demand such a second chamber, 
which would be controlled by Solidarity, as a 
political counterweight or opposition to the 
PUW P-controlled Sejm. Seen in such a
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context, it could at best be a recipe for 
constitutional confusion and deadlock, and at 
worst a prescription for escalating political 
confrontation.
Meanwhile the Sejm, which for so long 
played the role of a rubber stamp to the 
PUWP and the government, has been 
exercising more and more legislative 
initiative, as did the Czechoslovak parliament 
during the Prague Spring. On more than one 
occasion the government and the PUWP have 
been forced to back down and modify their 
proposals in face of opposition from both 
backbench Communist members and from 
the non-Communist parliamentary groups. 
In October this secured both the retention of 
concessions made to Solidarity on the self­
management bill and the withdrawal — at 
least for the immediate period ahead — of a 
proposal for a temporary ban on strikes.
Parties and elections
Poland has always been, at least nominally, 
a multi-party state. Two non-Communist 
parties exist alongside the PUWP, officially 
acknowledging its leadership, which has since 
1976 been enshrined in the Constitution. The 
Sejm, elected in March 1980, comprises 258 
PUWP members, 113 from the United 
Peasant Party, 38 from the Democratic Party 
and 48 non-party members including three 
small Catholic groups. The non-Communist 
groups are now playing an increasingly 
autonomous role, helping to enrich the 
hitherto normally dreary and predictable 
Sejm debates. Outside Parliament the non- 
Communist parties have more and more been 
taking independent stands on political issues.
Up till now, elections have always been held 
for both parliamentary and local elections on 
a single list of the National Unity Front, led 
by the PUWP and embracing all the 
abovementioned parties and groups. There is 
today widespread agreement not only in 
Solidarity but among all except the 
conservative minority in the PUWP on the 
desirability of changing this thoroughly 
discredited electoral system. Thus, on 
October 8, Hieronim Kubiak, Political 
Bureau member and Secretary of the Central
Committee of the PUWP, said: "The 
elaboration of a new pluralist formula for the 
National Unity Front, of a new method of 
election and of a reorganisation of the 
legislative system in the spirit of self­
management and the expansion of civil 
liberties is an important task. Under no 
circumstances can there be any question of 
restoring the pre-August 1980 order."2 
However, specific proposals seem to have 
been put off till nearer March 1984 when the 
next parliamentary elections are due. It 
should not prove impossible for Solidarity 
and the PUW P to negotiate an agreement 
before then on a new democratic electoral 
system, which will give the electors a 
possibility of political choice.
For some time there have been moves in 
some circles to form new political parties. The 
idea of a "Polish Labour Party" (PPS), 
launched by Jerzy Milewski, a Solidarity 
expert in Gdansk, has support among some 
sections of Solidarity, whose congress, 
however, declined to sponsor it. In Warsaw, 
Jacek Kuron, a former leader of KOR-KSS, 
has been involved in forming a "Club of the 
self-governing Republic", which has been the 
subject of police investigations. The attitude 
of the PUW P leadership to all such attempts 
is at present very hostile. How much popular 
support such projects get will depend to no 
small extent on how far the Peasant and 
Democratic Parties develop as autonomous 
organisations and are seen as giving 
expression to the views of the most important 
sections of critical non-communist opinion. 
Should the demand for a "Labour Party" 
obtain popular support, it would seem better 
to allow it to exist freely and legally and to 
confront its ideas and criticisms in open 
political debate. An extreme rightwing 
nationalist party like the Confederation of 
Independent Poland (KPN) might, however, 
require a different approach.
One of the most important points in the 
Gdansk Agreement stipulates: 'T he activity 
of the radio and TV and of the press and 
publications should serve for the expression 
of a diversity of ideas, views and opinions. It 
should be subject to public control."3 Very
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considerable progress has been made since 
then in that direction. However, the insistence 
of the PUW P on its "right" to control the 
media provokes continuous clashes and 
resentment, as does the persistent refusal to 
allow Solidarity to publish a daily paper on 
the spurious grounds of paper shortage, 
whilst organisations with much less support 
are allotted paper for theirs. The PUW P's 
break with the old authoritarian power 
structures would appear that much more 
decisive if it were to show itself less reluctant 
to extend to other popular forces the same 
democratic rights as communists everywhere 
demand for themselves.
Towards a historic compromise?
On the evening of November 4, Lech 
Walesa, Archbishop Glemp, the Catholic 
Primate of Poland, and General Jaruzelski 
met to discuss the formation of a Front of 
National Accord. Though at best only the 
first step in a long process, it could become the 
symbol of the desire of the three great social 
forces in Poland to lay a basis for working 
together for overcoming the crisis and 
democratising Polish society. This would be 
the perspective of a genuinely historic 
compromise.
This scenario would involve Solidarity 
giving up organising its activities in the 
expectation of a sharpening conflict with the 
government. Instead it would make proposals 
for social reform which would certainly 
compete with those of the PUWP. Such 
competition would, however, be seen as a 
necessary part of the working out of a 
compromise. The Catholic Church, as a 
conservative force in many social questions, 
would co-operate in the development of the 
socialist system. The PUWP would renounce 
any attempt to enforce its claim to exercise a 
leading role by administrative means and 
co n stitu tio n a lly  p rescribed  privileges. 
Instead, it would struggle on different social 
and political levels to convince the population 
of its ideas and be prepared for the period 
ahead to give up claims to exclusive positions 
of political power.
One can assume that such a historic 
compromise would have to include agreement 
at least on the following planes:—
The attainment of a compromise on self­
management would have to proceed from the 
interests of the majority of society, which 
requires both the renunciation of economic 
sectionalism and PUW P domination.
A social control over the media would have 
to be established, putting an end to their use 
as an instrument of ideological domination by 
the PUWP and guaranteeing access to all 
fo rces  a sso c ia te d  w ith  the h is to r ic  
compromise.
Possibilities would have to be created for 
giving institutional expression to the 
increasing pluralism that has developed in 
Polish society. This would entail candidates 
in local and national elections no longer being 
only permitted to stand on a single list put 
forward by the PUWP-controlled National 
Unity Front. This would not necessarily 
involve the formation of new parties, but 
would allow for regional initiatives and would 
enable Catholic groups and the already 
existing parties to contest separately if they 
wished to.
However, a second scenario is also possible. 
Such a historic compromise does not come 
about. Inside Solidarity those trends which 
are really committed to seeking such a 
compromise do not succeed in carrying the 
day. The PUW P, under pressure from 
Moscow,’ shows itself unwilling to give up 
sufficient of its prerogatives to be able to 
reach an agreement acceptable to Solidarity. 
The present political and economic tension 
becomes even more acute. In such a situation 
those favoring a return to the old set-up force 
the PUW P to change its strategy. The 
inclusive moves towards co-operation with 
Solidarity are broken off in favour of an 
authoritarian approach to overcoming the 
crisis. The P1JWP on its own takes charge of 
the economic reform, and prevents any 
further discussion on a pluralistic reform of 
the political system. Such a strategy would 
certainly rely on support from a section of the 
population, which has grown tired after
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nearly eighteen months of instability and 
disorder and is fed up with the inability of the 
Party and Solidarity to work together. This 
section of the population would be ready to 
abandon any comprehensive democratisation 
if the PUW P could convince them that it 
could at least effectively tackle the economic 
crisis. Such a solution would not be 
acceptable to the majority of Solidarity, as the 
attainment of its basic demands like access to 
the media, pluralistic reform of the electoral 
system and democratic participation in 
central economic planning would be blocked. 
Solidarity would therefore no doubt adopt a 
strategy of sharpened confrontation which 
would only leave the PUWP the option of 
suppressing the opposition movement, for 
example by mass arrests of strikers or the 
imprisonment of representatives of the 
"radical" wing of Solidarity.
The role of the army
Already today the importance of the army 
is increasing significantly, and could become 
crucial in enforcing authoritarian solutions 
either on behalf of the party or on its own 
account. For the first time in a socialist 
country a general holds the post of first 
secretary of the Party, along with that of 
prime minister and minister of defence. 
Alongside Jaruzelski, three other ministers 
are generals. At the end of October task forces 
of about 2,000 soldiers were given authority 
to go into the villages and take action to clear 
the supply lines and ease the shortages of food 
and other essentials, thereby taking over 
responsibilities of the local authorities. They 
were recalled after a month, but troops have 
now been sent into the towns for the same 
purpose. Both actions highlight the image of 
the army as the most — or perhaps only — 
efficient part of the state apparatus. At the 
time of writing, the PUWP Central 
Committee has just approved he drafting of a 
far-reaching Emergency Powers bill giving 
the government the right to ban strikes and 
meetings and extend the jurisdiction of 
military courts. It also appears to have 
watered down the idea of the Front of 
National accord. All this seems to increase the
possibility of this second scenario, which 
could pave the way for a third and even more 
disastrous one.
The third scenario is a Soviet intervention, 
possibly on the invitation of a Polish 
government under pressure from within and 
without. Whilst Moscow has tolerated more 
far-reaching developments in Poland than 
would have been thought possible in July 
1980, this does not mean that there are no 
limits. From the point of view of the Soviet 
Union four essential factors militate against 
an  in te rv e n tio n . F irs tly , u n lik e  in 
Czechoslovakia, they would have to reckon 
with massive resistance in Poland. Secondly, 
the Soviet Union would create additional 
problems for its own economy by acquiring 
responsibility for the Polish economy. 
Thirdly, as a result of the ever more aggressive 
concepts of the US government there would 
be the danger because of Poland of an 
escalation of the two blocks on the 
military plane, not in central Europe but 
somewhere in the world. Fourthly, the 
growing success of the peace movement in 
Western Europe would be undone at a stroke.
The connection of developments in Poland 
with the development of the European left 
should be underlined. If the historic 
compromise that we have discussed can be 
achieved, it would give an enormous boost to 
the left forces that stand for a pluralistic 
so c ia lism  in W este rn  E u ro p e . An 
a u th o rita r ia n  "so lu tion" or a Soviet 
intervention would give the rightwing 
ideologists am m unition  for a ttack in g  
socialism as being in principle hostile to 
democracy. However, the success of the West 
European peace movement in preventing the 
stationing of NATO medium range missiles 
could increase the tolerance of the Soviet 
Union towards pluralistic developments in 
Poland.
NOTES
1. Morning Star (London), 5 Sept, 1980.
2. Le Monde (Paris), 10 Oct, 1981.
3. Morning Star (London), 5 Sept, 1980.
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To Live Better, 
To Change Life by Mark Burford*
The Common Programme of the French Left, 
1972-1978 Soon after the signing of the "Common 
Programme for a Government of Left Union" 
by the French Communist Party (PCF), 
Socialist Party (PS) and Left Radicals, the 
Socialist leader F ranco is M itte rran d  
remarked to his Second International 
colleagues in Vienna that in time the PCF 
vote in the French electorate would be 
reduced to 15 percent of the electorate with 
equivalen t gains tran sfe rrin g  to the 
socialists.1 At the time those claims may have 
seemed outrageous and extravagant but, 
today, with a communist vote of just over 15 
percent in the presidential elections of May 
1981 and the parliamentary elections of the 
following month, and substantial socialist 
victories in those elections, they seem 
positively prophetic.
The victory of M itterrand in the 
presidential elections, and the left in the 
French parliamentary elections, marks a 
significant advance for the left in France. It 
compels us to look at some aspects of the 
history of the French left and its strategy for 
electoral victory as a way of understanding 
the situation of the socialist movement in 
France.
Here, I am examining the period of 
agreement between the left parties around the 
Common Programme of the French Left and 
looking at key aspects of the Programme 
itself and the events of the years 1972-78. 
What were the reasons for this temporary 
programmatic consolidation of the "Union of 
the Left"? How did the major parties, the PS 
and PCF, hope to benefit? What were the 
main points of agreement and difference? 
Why did the Common Programme fail and 
recede into history after the March 1978
* The author is a Politics' student at Flinders
University, South Australia.
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elections? What does the period tell us about 
the PCF and PS? These are the sorts of 
questions I seek to answer.
In many ways the logic of the recent 
socialist electoral victory and the communist 
setback was set up during the Common 
Programme years, particularly the time of its 
demise in late 1977 and early 1978. Then, the 
socialists, having made gains over the 
previous year, decided to  seize the 
opportunity and move out alone, looking for 
electoral victory while the communists 
stepped back.
The Common Programme
The Common Programme was signed by 
Georges Marchais, PCF Secretary-General, 
and Francois M itterrand on the night of June 
26-27, 1972. A few days later the Programme 
was endorsed by the Left Radicals. 
Immediately the PCF went out and publicised 
the Programme, publishing it in paperback. It 
was, as Feenberg remarks, "the sort of book 
that nobody reads"2 but its symbolic 
importance as a concrete showing of unity 
was paramount. Soon after publication by the 
PCF, the socialists and radicals put out their 
own editions.
The Common Programme was a plan of 
major, progressive reform for French society 
in the economy, in democracy, in welfare and 
social spheres; and in foreign policy. The 
economic proposals of the Programme were 
basic. M ajor na tio n alisa tio n s  in key 
industrial and financial areas of the economy 
were called for. In this enlarged public sector 
the workers would wield a greater influence 
th ro u g h  a sy stem  of " d e m o c ra tic  
management" which would put workers' 
representatives, probably from the trade 
unions, on the boards of management. The 
Common Programme also paid some 
attention to questions of quality of work, 
guaranteeing shorter hours, limited night 
shifts, regulation of work speed, increased job 
training, some access to study leave and 
technology and pollution controls.
In the social sphere a wide range of 
liberalisations and new freedoms were
proposed, ranging from recognition of 
tenants' unions through increased cultural 
funding and new student allowances to 
extended maternity leave and free legalised 
abortion. In international affairs the 
Common Programme proposed to abolish 
the French nuclear strike force,3 stop arms 
sales to colonial regimes, recognise the 
independence of the remaining French 
colonies, work for the dissolution of the 
Warsaw Pact and NATO, and continue co­
operation with the Common Market.
From the beginning there were problems in 
the campaign to promote the Common 
P rogram m e. The PS leader openly 
announced his aim of taking votes from the 
communists and the PCF showed its distrust 
of the PS. Marchais reported to the PCF 
Central Committee two days after the signing 
of the Common Programme that: "At the 
bottom, the ideology animating the Socialist 
Party is and remains absolutely reformist."4
The PS was quick to distance itself from the 
PCF when necessary. They also wished to 
push the PCF on the issues of its Soviet link 
and internal party democracy. This sort of 
tension and pressure was to be maintained 
throughout the period of the Common 
Programme, often peaking, then being 
resolved before important election times.
Despite these sorts of problems, the Union 
of the Left was maintained, moving from one 
electoral gain to another until it seemed 
certain to succeed in 1978. However, the 
tensions of electoral balance, theoretical 
differences and campaign difficulties proved 
too strong.
The Common Programme ended with the 
narrow defeat of the Union of the Left in the 
March 1978 National Assembly elections. 
The final disharmony that led to this defeat 
began in 1977 with the renegotiation of the 
details of the Common Programme. In 
September, the negotiations which had 
floundered over differences in interpretation 
of the Programme, and revisions to it, came to 
a standstill. Francois M itterrand had this to 
say:
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What is happening in the Communist Party? 
What's wrong here? Isn't it because the 
Socialist Party has become the first party of 
France, of the left, because we have carried 
off so many victories? As for our partners, 
they have stayed at the level where they 
were.5
Mitterrand laid the blame at the feet of the 
PCF, as a party that was not willing to take 
part in government, even a government of the 
left, if it was not dominant. In the run-up to 
the 1978 elections the PCF had to face the fact 
that its strategy to "strengthen the left", 
strengthen the PCF within the left” had failed. 
This was emphasised by the strong socialist 
and the only mediocre communist showing in 
the 1977 municipal elections. The mid-1977 
opinion polls showed 30 percent support for 
the PS and 21 percent for the PC F .6
This prospect of a secondary position in the 
left worried the communists, hence Marchais' 
announcement that "21 percent is not enough, 
25 percent would be good".7 Given the votes 
of the Left Radicals, this was tantamount to 
suggesting that the Socialist Party step back 
to being the junior partner, clearly an unreal 
demand and one unacceptable to the PS.
Tactical manoeuvring
But these splits were not simply a question 
of tactical electoral manoeuvring. There were, 
as observers at the time noted, "differing 
interpretations of the 1972 version of the 
Common Programme" — differences over 
how a left government would behave in 
France. There were problems over updating, 
in te rp re ta tio n  and ex tensions to  the 
Programme. Nationalisation, wealth tax 
measures, the concept of self-management 
and the cost of the Programme seem to have 
been the main problems.
After the 1977 failure in the negotiations, 
each party went on the offensive. The PCF 
publicly claimed that the PS had "moved to 
the right" and merely wished to "manage the 
social crisis in the interests of big capital and 
continue to impose austerity upon the 
workers.* The socialists, published their own 
version of an updated Common Programme.
The head-on position between the parties 
was maintained until after the first round of 
voting in March 1978. After a disappointing 
showing for the left, a peace meeting was 
convened and a patch-up agreement signed. 
T he fin a l re su lt show ed th a t th is 
rapprochement was seen as too shallow and 
had come too late. The left parties gained 
seats (the PS 9 and the PCF 12) but the gains 
were insufficient to win government.
The defeat of the left unleashed 
recriminations from both sides. The PCF 
Political Bureau stated firmly that: 'The 
direct cause of the failure of the left to come to 
power lies in the disastrous and suicidal 
strategy of the PS and nowhere else."10
The Executive Bureau of the Socialist Party 
called upon workers to judge the".... strategy 
of failure of the Communist Party, which had 
deprived them of their victory and of the 
changes which would have come to each of 
them ."11
Of far more interest was the outburst of 
criticism that arose within the PCF, an 
o u tb u rs t  th a t  was sp ea rh ea d ed  by 
intellectuals but seems to have had a 
substantial basis am ong rank-and-file 
militants as well. The debate that followed 
raised most of the key issues of the Common 
Programme.
The meaning of the Programme
What did the signing of the Common 
Programme mean for the PS and PCF? What 
did they hope to achieve with it? The answers 
reveal important tensions in the Union of the 
Left.
Both the PS and PCF wished to participate 
in a left government. There is no real reason to 
doubt this, despite the PCF's late 1977 and 
early 1978 behaviour. The socialists saw 
themselves as an almost purely electoral 
party; in fact without parliam entary 
rep resen ta tio n  they had little  power 
whatsoever. So it was clear for them. On the 
PCF, Georges Lavau noted that "for the 
moment, one thing is certain, that it wants to 
be in power. That is all we can say for sure."12 
But neither party wanted the power of
To Live Better, To Change Life 35
government just for its own sake.
Of course both the socialists and the 
communists had made it clear right from the 
beginning that they wanted power and 
hegemony of the left. But they are political 
organisations of conviction and theory, both 
of them. They wanted government to put their 
vision into practice. Problems arose, 
however, when it became clear that the 
respective PS and PCF "visions" of the 
Com m on P rogram m e were m arkedly 
different.
F o r the  so c ia lis ts , the  C om m on 
Programme was a real programme of reform. 
It was exactly the kind of thing that a 
reforming social-democratic party and 
government should put into practice. The 
Programme amounted to the party's ends. 
The commitment of the Socialist Party to the 
sort of reform programme outlined in the 
Common Programme is made clear by its 
early 1972 pre-signing platform. It spelt out a 
series of progressive moves such as 
nationalisation of the banks and finance 
companies and some major industry, the 
setting up of a proportional representation 
electoral system, a ban on television 
advertising, legislation for free abortion and 
divorce by mutual consent, the repeal of the 
death sentence, nuclear dissolution and a 
move to wind down both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact agreement.
Similarly the late 1977 pre-election update 
of the Common Programme suggested by the 
socialists shows them sticking to reform. 
Among the proposals agreed to by both sides 
in the updated Programme were: an increase 
in unemployment benefits to two-thirds of the 
minimum wage, reduction of the working 
week to 35 hours, the setting up of low-cost 
housing schemes, a consumer-level price 
freeze, new checks on m u ltina tional 
ownership, an extension of the proportional 
system in municipal elections and increased 
funding for welfare.
In addition, the socialists made concessions 
to the communists, agreeing to a new wealth 
tax, an increased number of nationalisations 
and an increased m inim um  w age . 13
Mitterrand was quite correct when he pointed 
out in January 1978 that the socialists had not 
abandoned the Common Programme and 
"were continuing to use it as their charter". 
That was true. What the communists failed to 
see properly was that the socialist vision was 
inherently limited and reformist.
The PCF vision
The PCF, on the other hand, had a 
different view of things. The Common 
Programme was not the end of things at all; it 
was the beginning, opening up a stage of 
"advanced democracy" which set up the 
possibility for a move to socialism. Socialism 
itself was something different. Early in the 
C om m on Program m e period  Georges 
Marchais pointed this out in a report'to the 
PCF Political Bureau. He said:
The Political Bureau considers that, even if 
the enterprise is difficult and nothing is won 
in advance, the conditions and the means 
exist which will permit the experiment to 
have a positive outcome, and that the 
common programme constitutes a step 
forward in the genera! struggle of the 
working class and of our people for social 
progress, democracy and socialism.14
The PCF had a concept, however limited it 
may have been in theoretical scope, of a 
process, of transition to a new kind of French 
society.
This view of the Common Programme as 
part of a strategy for socialism arose from the 
PCF's adherence, as late as 1977, to the thesis 
of "state monopoly capitalism". This thesis 
tends to see the state in the phase of late or 
monopoly capitalism as being "fused" with 
monopoly capital. It is "a state with no 
autonomy that is purely at the service of the 
monopolies".15
Arising from this view are two important 
strategic aspects. Firstly, a broad, democratic 
alliance has to be built, encompassing all 
those who are in opposition to the 
monopolies. This alliance is to be built so as to 
encourage broadness and such as to approach 
"men (and women) as they are, not as they
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should be. The PCF used the metaphor of the 
"bolted door" to illustrate the state in this 
phase. Only a huge and broad alliance could 
effectively confront the "bolted door" of the 
state and the monopolies. 16 The Common 
Programme was an attempt to construct this 
alliance. Secondly, because the state is seen as 
a simple tool in the service of monopoly the 
winning of government power is crucial in 
taking this tool out of the hands of the 
monopolies and putting it at the service of the 
people. The achieving of government, 
through the Union of the Left, therefore 
assumes great importance.
While it is true that this view of late 
capitalism, and of the transition to socialism, 
was subject to major criticism, mainly from 
the left of the PCF, this need not concern us 
overly much here. The critics claimed that the 
state monopoly capitalism thesis did not 
embody an understanding of contradiction 
within the state apparatus and the relative 
autonomy of the state. Socialist transition, 
therefore, was a much more complex thing 
involving an interaction of various economic, 
ideological and po litica l levels and 
complicated class alliances than just the 
simple anti-monopoly alliance.17 But these 
were all differences over the nature of the 
transition. That the PCF was talking about 
the transition to socialism was never in doubt.
With the bulk of the PS not seeing things 
this way, conflict was inevitable. Mitterrand, 
the real strategist for the Socialist Party, as 
well as its political leader, foretold the future 
that he planned for the communists.
The Communist Party is our natural ally .... 
I am not obliged to extend it any privilege; I 
am not obliged to give it preference. I 
observe simply that the unification of the 
Left involves the Communist Party .... And 
from this stems the importance which I 
attach to the formation of a political 
movement able first to achieve parity with 
and then dominate the Communist Party; 
and, finally, to obtain by itself a majority 
role .... One may doubt the sincerity of 
communist intentions, but to found a 
political strategy on the intentions one 
imputes to others makes no sense. What is 
important is to create the conditions which
make these others act as if they were sincere.
When M itterrand speaks of "sincerity" here 
he means keeping the communists within the 
bounds of the mainstream Socialist Party 
aims, that is, within the bounds of reform.
Austerity and capitalist crisis
Related to the question of what the 
Common Programme actually meant for the 
Socialist and Communist parties is the 
problem of how or whether a left government 
in France would cope with the capitalist crisis 
of the 1970s. For the Common Programme 
was formulated during a time of relative 
prosperity for the capitalist world. 1977-78 
was a different matter entirely. The now 
f a m i l i a r  p r o b le m s  o f  i n f l a t i o n ,  
unemployment, flagging production and 
lower consumer demand were very apparent 
to the parties of the left.
The socialists responded by stepping back. 
Their programme of reform, mentioned 
above, was maintained but restricted. Their 
commitment to wage increases, social welfare 
betterment, taxes on wealth and the like were 
tempered by the fear of exacerbating inflation 
and further dampening production. In the 
socialist sense and in the social-democratic 
sense, they wanted to retreat.
In Marchais' words, the Socialist Party's 
position
would have meant giving up our position on 
the minimum wage; giving up the immediate 
increase of purchasing power; the full extent 
of measures to reduce unemployment; .... 
the immediate reduction of hours of work 
and the introduction of a fifth week of paid 
holidays; giving up effective nationalisation 
of banking and finance and of the nine 
industrial groupings put forward in 1971; 
giving up the tax on capital and wealth. It 
would also have meant giving up the 
democratic content of the common 
programme ,...18
He may have been a little off-beam with the 
claims about "giving up" nationalisation and 
any form of wealth tax but essentially the
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PCF Secretary General was correct. In the 
PCF's eyes this was nothing more than 
capitulation which would force "austerity" 
upon the people of France as a way to revive 
the economy. The PCF was not interested "in 
managing the capitalist crisis".
For the PCF, as a responsible party of the 
left, is this really the response? Indeed, were 
they asking the right questions? Need the 
battle for left government be one of managing 
the crisis or nothing? That was how the PCF 
seemed to respond.
Did the PCF condemnation of the PS mean 
that it actually thought the socialists had 
changed their spots? The suggestion that the 
PS had "turned to the right" as the 
Communist Party claimed seems to indicate 
this to be the case. But how consistent is this 
view of a change with the view expressed at 
the same time that the socialists were always 
interested in managing the system and no 
more? Marchais, in a later section of the same 
report quoted above, claimed that the 
Socialist Party had not changed its nature 
since the signing of the Common Programme.
Six years of experience have shown that the 
Socialist Party did not undergo any real 
change .... Under the cover of a leftist and 
pro-unity phraseology, which allowed them 
to win over people who were sincerely in 
favour of unity and change, it remained a 
social-democratic party, which does not 
aime to bring about democratic change.20
The confusion of the communist leader's 
position comes through. The real situation 
was that the PCF could no longer keep a 
basically social-democratic party from 
making the concessions any party of that kind 
would make in the face of capitalist crisis. The 
Socialist Party had strengthened its position 
in the Union to that extent. Now the problem 
for the communists was whether to take the 
measure of progressive reforms they could get 
(and remember that the socialists'concessions 
were still quite "left" by comparison to most 
social-democratic policies to be found around 
the world at the time) or reject the alliance 
altogether.
Were the communists really sure that even
their optimal version of the Common 
Programme would benefit France's working 
people under the sort of conditions prevailing 
in 1978? After all, the Common Programme, 
even when including the new nationalisations 
wanted by the PCF, was still only a 
programme of advanced democratic reform
— it was not socialism. Surely the very logic 
of the PCF's Common Programme transition 
strategy would bestow the same status (if less 
favourably) upon the Socialist Party's 
watered down version? It would still "open 
up" the possibility for change while 
substantially improving the lot of French 
workers and their allies.
None of the areas of concession mentioned 
by Marchais, not even the possibility of 
austerity measures, take from the Common 
Programme its strategic emphasis, its concept 
of change as a process rather than an event or 
a government decree, it seems that really the 
PCF had lost faith in its strategy, or didn't 
understand that strategy when it came close to 
really putting it into practice. Rather than 
confront this the Communist Party almost 
seemed to prefer staying in a more 
comfortable but less responsible opposition.
The result was unsatisfactory for the left as 
a whole and for the Communist Party. The 
left was to remain out of government, 
meaning that no reforms, no matter how 
minimal, of the left programme could be put 
into practice. Within the left, the Socialist 
Party gave the appearance of being the 
responsible partner in the union, the one that 
was at least willing to make a go of governing 
even under difficulty. The Communist Party 
was seen, correctly, as the abstentionist party 
content to remain "within the fortress" with its 
solid 20 percent vote and make few advances. 
That this could in time weaken even that 20 
percent support was a possibility not lost to 
critics within the party.
These same critics also took the view that 
many of the battles, including those over 
austerity and nationalisation, could have 
been fought out within a Union of the Left 
government rather than within a left fighting 
for electoral victory — an argument that 
makes perfect electoral sense, especially in
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terms of the sort of socialist strategy mapped 
out by the Common Programme.21 The PCF 
would then have shown a proper willingness 
as a communist party to take on the 
responsibility of government even in difficult 
circumstances, as a part of the struggle for 
advanced democracy and socialism.
This is a position that was, in my view, 
more honest with both the electorate and 
communist militants, an honesty which the 
PCF failed to deliver.
Ownership and control 
of industry
The actual "break" on the left occurred over 
nationalisations. The immediate tension was 
over the interpretation of the 1972 version of 
the Programme. The issue was whether 
subsidiaries with less than 100 percent 
ownership by a major firm listed in the 
"group" for nationalisation would be 
similarly treated, a move which added over 
one thousand firms to the original group of 
nine; whether six more industrial giants, 
including all of the steel industry, would be 
added to the list, and whether a left 
government would nationalise a particular 
company in the event of its workers 
expressing a wish'for the company to be taken 
into public ownership.22
There were two crucial theoretical 
questions involved with nationalisation 
which, apart from the electoral and 
immediate economic concern of the cost of 
compensation, illustrated further differences. 
One involved the econom ic role of 
nationalisation. The other involved the 
question of self-management.
The socialists did not see widespread 
nationalisation as being all that important, 
while the communists obviously did. Holland 
cites a number of French sources to suggest 
that on interpretation of the 1972 Programme 
"it is possible to give the PCF a good deal of 
benefit on the overall doubt".23 He points out 
that, given that most large corporations are 
themselves composed of subsidiaries with 
varying shares of percentage ownership, it is 
not really clear that nationalisation would be 
meaningful had subsidiaries with a 51 percent
or more holding by the major corporation not 
been included. Certainly it would have made 
government influence over the economy more 
difficult, something the socialists were less 
concerned about, certainly in the short term.
Many socialists were not firm on major 
nationalisation at all. For some of them, 
including economic adviser Jacques Attali, 
and former United Socialist Party leader 
Michel Rocard, the question of control was 
more central to both influencing the economy 
and improving the lives of workers. They took 
up the slogan first raised in 1968 — 
"autogestion" or self-management. It was not 
clear whether the official PS version of self­
management was a form of participation in 
running industry or something more. In any 
case, they argued that the key to socialism was 
a change in the "social relations" of 
p ro d u c tio n  and co n tro l ra th e r than  
ownership and that therefore to demand 
major nationalisation alone was to bark up 
the wrong tree.
The communists disagreed, arguing that 
ownership remained crucial. Their model of 
"democratic management" was no real 
solution to the problem of control though. At 
best it offered another bureaucratic layer on 
the participation thesis. Under the PCF's 
proposal, industry would be run by a board 
with government and union representatives 
participating. Any active role would be 
removed from the rank-and-file worker and 
put in the hands of his/her union official. Not 
coincidentally, the French union movement 
was under the major influence of the 
co m m u n is t-d o m in a te d  C o n fe d e ra tio n  
Generale du Travail (CGT). The PCF 
proposal would give the party itself major 
influence when the government and union 
representatives were combined. This is hardly 
a fully "democratic" alternative.
The fo rm u la tio n  of the Com m on 
Programme which read that "on the basis of a 
large public and nationalised sector, the 
government will favour, in law and in reality, 
the development of democratic forms of 
management"24, masked both the differences 
the parties had on this question and the fact 
that neither of them understood exactly what
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it meant when they appropriated the term 
autogestion. During the 1978 election 
campaign the PCF did an about-face and 
began using the term "autogestion", a term 
which they had previously derided. This did 
not seem to alter their view of the role of 
workers in management but is an indication 
of the influence and importance of the 
concept in France.
The left and the new 
social movements
An important feature of the M ay/June 
events in 1968 was the spotlighting of an 
emerging, articulate "middle strata" of 
salaried workers and professionals. The 
Common Programme was in some ways a 
response to this and represented a shift of 
these strata, or a portion of them, to the 
consolidated left. Both the PS and the PCF 
recognised the importance of this.
The Common Programme therefore had a 
strong flavour of developing new freedoms in 
the personal and private spheres of life and 
towards understanding the new "quality of 
life" movements that had their basis in the 
cultural shifts of the 1960s. A decisive nod was 
made in the direction of the ecology 
movement, the movement for women's rights 
and liberation, self-management as we have 
noted, the homosexual movement (to a small 
extent), the student movement and others.
The Union of the Left as a whole was 
successful in raising the hopes of these groups 
and these middle strata. The problem of party 
competition arose here again, however, the 
Socialist Party being much more successful 
than the communists in gaining voter 
support. As George Ross points out, the PCF 
was aware of the problem and engaged in a 
number of publicity-type operations stressing 
its devotion to democracy and freedom and 
the issues it knew appealed. But it was not 
believed. Why? Principally because of the 
party's past and the time needed to prove itself 
different. In any case, the party needed time to 
understand the issues itself. Ross observed 
that
While things were changing in the PCF, the
party was unable to convince intermediary 
social groups that they had changed enough. 
Beyond this the PCF demonstrated an 
almost perverse reluctance to broach issues 
which were obviously salient to new middle 
class groups in ways which would be 
favourably received. In the 1970's 
autogestion, feminism and ecology 
(including the nuclear power issue) all 
caused great concern in new middle groups. 
On all of these issues the PCF scorned the 
arguments which were put forward by the 
protest groups which raised these issues.25
The Socialist Party which had brought 
together some of the elements involved in the 
'68 events managed to gather this support. 
This was probably the most important area 
which confirmed the socialist advances 
through the period of the Common 
Programme while the communist position 
stagnated. The communsits, quite simply, 
could not break out of their old logic. This 
was essential if it was to move beyond its 
position of the formal, staid French left 
opposition. Althusser, and others such as 
theorist Jean Ellenstein, saw this opportunity 
in the practice of the Common Programme. 
There was a need, he said, to abandon
fortress-like withdrawal and (begin) 
resolutely involving the Party in the mass 
movement, extending its zone of influence 
through struggle, and finding in that mass 
oriented struggle, the real reasons for 
transforming the Party, by giving it the life 
that comes fiom the masses.26
Strategy and alliance
When analysing the relationship between 
the PCF and the PS around the Common 
Programme, the communist leadership used 
to like talking about "the struggle for the 
common programme". I have emphasised a 
number of times already the competitive 
nature of the Union of the Left. Usually this 
competition is seen just in terms of votes but 
we now know it was more than that. 
Programmatic points, attitudes to social 
change and the allegiance of the working class 
and middle strata were involved too.
This raises the question of the nature of 
alliances. How do parties of the social-
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democratic and communist left engage in 
electoral agreements and strategic alliances?
The socialists were clear on this. 
Mitterrand's many statements show that they 
hoped to win votes, limit the scope of 
communist influence and put their reform 
programme into practice. The communists 
were not so clear. At times it seemed that the 
communists were involved in the union 
merely to come to power and gain dominance 
over the Socialist Party on the left. But is that 
a sufficient view for a party concerned with 
socialist transition?
It is not enough to see an alliancc of this 
sort in terms of votes alone. Of course, votes 
are important as a measure of support and as 
a way to gain office, thereby allowing policies 
to be put into practice. But M archais'dictum 
of "21 percent is not enough, 25 percent would 
be good" goes no further than that at all. It is 
simply a statement of the desire to dominate 
the PS.
There are problems with Marchais' 
formula. Firstly, consider the trade union 
movement. With the Communist Party 
holding sway in the huge trade union 
federation, the CGT, need it worry about 
being an "auxiliary force" to the socialists in 
the wider political sphere? But more 
important than evening up the political 
balance, the communist role in the trade 
union movement gives it a strategic lever in 
the heartland of socialist politics, in the key 
organisations of workers' defence. The 
alliance can then be built and fought for at 
another political level. Democratic and 
socialist change can be struggled for in the 
workplace and in the union movement. That 
is, if the Communist Party understood and 
worked for other aspects of the alliance than 
the purely electoral.
The second problem with Marchais' 
approach was precisely that it did see the 
alliance as purely electoral. Hence the ease 
with which it could be sacrificed when it 
became clear that electoral advantage was not 
accruing to the PCF. But alliances for 
democratic and socialist transition must work 
at more than the electoral level. They must
extend to involve classes and class fractions, 
seeking to win them over to more advanced 
positions. In communist jargon, alliances 
must be forged and won amongst the masses. 
The PCF made the mistake of leaving the 
agreements and battles at the level of formal 
agreement between parties rather than 
agreement and struggle between ideas 
amongst the people.
For example, the Programme was signed, it 
was printed and distributed but there was 
only a limited attempt to have it discussed and 
acted upon. Propaganda and slogans do not 
replace the taking up of issues in the mass way 
suggested earlier. That would be the sort of 
thing that would help to build the alliance on 
two fronts — one of formal party agreement, 
the other a transitional or "counter- 
hegemonic" approach to alliances. This was 
very much the "left" criticism within the PCF 
expressed forcefully by Althusser and 
Balibar. Ellenstein, representing the "right" 
dissidents was no less firm on the need to 
broaden the struggle for the Programme. At 
the time, left and right differences over the 
strategy seemed minimal, most of them 
having related to the earlier issue of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.
Democracy and stalinisrn
These were the issues which party activists 
were discussing in the period leading up to, 
and especially after, the defeat of the left in the 
1978 elections. We have dealt mainly with the 
questions raised in the PCF and by 
communist intellectuals because it was in that 
party where the most discussion took place, at 
least as far as we can tell, and where the 
discussion reached a theoretical depth. The 
socialists certainly had their splits and 
dissensions after March 1978, but these seem 
to have been in the more traditional mould of 
leadership challenges and factional squabbles 
than m ajor theo re tical and strateg ic 
debates.27
For the Communist Party and its internal 
critics, there was one overriding concern — 
the question of democracy within the party 
and the break with stalinisrn. It was the
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strength or weakness of the party as an open 
and democratic organisation which would 
determine whether the whole range of tactical 
and strategic questions regarding the Union 
of the Left would be asked and answered at 
all. Party democracy was paramount — a 
problem to be solved before others could be 
properly approached.
Hence the stress all post-election comments 
placed on the need for discussion, self- 
criticism and openness. No matter whether 
the criticism came from the "light" or the 
"left" of the party, this emphasis was 
consistent. For example, Jean Ellenstein said:
It has become clearer now that the PCF will 
have to carry out the initiatives symbolised 
by the 22nd congress to their conclusion in 
every field ....
Whatever the issue .... many communists 
have asked questions about the methods 
used .... and have criticised them ....
Let it not be said that these are intellectual 
problems for intellectuals. They are relevant 
questions hundreds of thousands of 
communists are asking themselves today. 
The party's refusal to discuss them in public 
appears to be more tragic than it really is. 
What would be tragic however is if it 
continued to reject the public discussion that 
so many communists are looking forward 
to .28
ana Louis Althusser:
The defeat of the Union of the Left has 
seriously confused the popular masses and 
filled many communists with profound 
disquiet. A 'workerist' — or more precisely 
sectarian — faction is openly rejoicing at 
the break with the Socialist Party, 
presenting it as a victory over the social- 
democratic danger.... While they wait for 
an explanation from the Party leadership, 
the militants are themselves beginning to 
analyse the process that led to the defeat: 
namely, the line actually followed by the 
Party, with all its somersaults, and the 
vagaries of its practice .... 29
Ellenstein and Althusser joined forces to 
the extent that they, along with over 100 other 
party members, banded together to publish
an open letter to the party leadership in the 
May 17 edition of Le Monde. Although there 
was a certain naivety in the expectations of 
the critics, in that at times they seemed to 
suggest that merely by opening up debate and 
by making some structural changes to 
encourage that debate, the problems of 
French communism would be solved, their 
criticisms seem justified and pointed.
The PCF and the Comintern
The PCF had had a long history of enclosed 
behaviour. It was the perverse "model" of 
Leninism that developed in the stalinist 
period of the Third International. In the 
period of the Union of the Left, in all its stages 
from the PCF's first suggestions in the 1960s 
to the break in 1978, there had been pressure 
on the Communist Party to break with its 
stalinist past. This would, on one hand, 
sweeten the pill for the socialists, hesitant 
about an alliance with the PCF and, on the 
other hand, take the party further towards 
establishing the independence and democracy 
demanded by the need to distance itself from 
the Soviet Union and find a place among the 
Eurocommunists.
B oth  these needs were m u tu a lly  
advantageous and, for a period, the PCF 
seemed to be responding in concrete ways. 
One of the great promises of the Common 
Programme for the communist movement in 
France and elsewhere was that it showed new, 
less sectarian, more open and co-operative 
ways forward, and showed the ability ol 
communist parties to change. There were 
lapses of course. Even one of the PCF's most 
symbolic "breaks" with the past — the 
abandonment of the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat" formulation — was done in the 
old undemocratic way. Georges Marchais 
announced the fact on television one week 
before the 22nd congress decision and 
without adequate or reasonable debate. For 
democrats in the party, even those that agreed 
with the move, this was considered 
outrageous. But, overall, a hopeful process 
was occurring.
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The events of 1977-78, the twists of the 
party line, the break with the PS followed by 
its hasty patching up between rounds of 
voting and the defeat of the Union must have 
brought unpleasant memories to the minds of 
many. These events amounted to a setback for 
the process of real democratisation in the 
PCF. The stifling of debate and the isolating 
of critics (and the later expulsions) after the 
election marked the defeat for this process.
The Union of the Left became impossible to 
restore after the 1978 election defeat. The 
Socialist Party regrouped and prepared to 
battle on as the major force on the left. The 
PCF retreated behind its traditional "buffer 
zone" of the 20 percent vote. Within the party 
itself the sectarian anti-Eurocommunist 
faction gained support while the critics 
mentioned above continued to be vocal.
Despite the conventional analysis which 
solely blames the Marchais leadership for the 
shift back to the methods of old, a more 
refined view sees the general secretary and his 
supporters playing a balancing act at the head 
of a very divided party .30
The party has remained in that divided 
state to this day. Despite the presence of four 
communist ministers in the government and 
despite continued hopes for socialist change 
in France, the PCF has not consolidated or 
gained from the left victory in 1981. Reports 
suggest that party activism is at its lowest ebb 
since the 1930s; membership is down and 
party-sponsored surveys suggest its popular 
vote is now as low as 10 percent, well below 
the old "buffer zone".31
Clearly, there is a need for a reassessment 
and overhaul of the PCF's current strategy. 
The recently concluded 24th congress seems 
not to have succeeded in that regard. All 
reports suggest that the party's course has
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A Hundred Years of 
Socialism in Australia
by Eric Fry
(Based on a paper given at the Communists and the Labor Movement Conference, Melbourne, 
August 1980.)
Beliefs and theories cannot be understood 
separated from the society in which they exist 
and which gives rise to them. I will outline the 
main changes in Australia over a century, the 
setting for socialist ideas. I will not be able to 
say much about the other side of the coin, the 
ruling classes and their dominant ideologies, 
against which the socialist ideas were put 
forward. I have also to leave aside, largely, the 
individual men and women who formulated 
and fought for revolutionary principles, many 
of whom are commemorated and some of 
whom, themselves, are participants at this 
conference. My purpose is to show that, for a 
hundred years, socialism has been a force in 
the making of Australia.
We could trace socialist ideas back more 
than a century if we wished. As early as the
1830s some notions of producers' and 
consumers' co-operatives were current 
among the artisans of Sydney, derived from 
Robert Owen, and brought here by chartists 
and radicals. Later, in Melbourne, a 
scattering of European revolutionary exiles 
discussed socialist theories in their clubs. 
Socialist ideas that count, however, take root 
only when they answer the perceived needs of 
a working class in a capitalist mode of 
production.
From about 1860, Australia became a 
predominantly capitalist economy despite its 
distance from the world centres of capitalism, 
despite the pioneering which continued on its 
frontiers, and despite the hopes that gold or 
cheap land would make it a country of
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independent producers or yeoman farmers. 
The most profitable industry was large-scale 
wool growing, the main support of the 
merchants and financiers who exported 
primary products to Britain and imported 
manufactured goods in return. The largest 
en terp rises were B ritish firm s which 
controlled shipping, banking and the raising 
of new capital. The processing of raw 
materials and the supply of everyday goods 
was giving rise to some local manufacturing. 
Transport and distribution, building and 
construction were important in the economy, 
shared between many small businesses and a 
few large ones. The cities of Sydney and 
Melbourne were growing to populations of 
half a million as the centres of this economy.
This was commercial rather than industrial 
capitalism, a colonial economy dependent on 
Britain, not an autonomous one, providing a 
place for a substantial petty bourgeoisie — 
tradesmen, small owners, contractors, agents, 
shopkeepers, farmers, who were self- 
employed. Yet. the mode of production — the 
way the economy was organised — was 
capitalist. A simple measure of this is the 
census of 1891 which recorded the sources of 
income of all breadwinners. Less than 15 
percent were employers of labour, another 15 
percent were working on their own account, 
and about 70 percent were wage or salary 
earners. This is a picture of capitalist relations 
of production in which more than two-thirds 
of the income earners are employees, 
although from the other side, almost one- 
third are employers of labour or self- 
employed, showing a broad, rather than 
narrow, top to the class structure.
Relations of production are not the whole 
of class relations, which enter into and are, in 
turn, permeated by, the entire web of social 
life — law, politics, family, ideology. Class, 
too, is a dynamic relationship, not a static set 
of categories. Nevertheless, a picture at a 
point of time is revealing so long as we 
recognise the forces which produced it and 
will change it. I only want to make the point 
that by the late nineteenth century Australia 
was a capitalist country and that therefore we 
find socialist ideas emerging in opposition to
capitalist ideology. This dialectic is the one 
thing of which we can be certain.
Socialist ideas before 1890 were utopian, 
that is, the reality of capitalist society was 
contrasted with an ideal society based on 
abstractions such as "justice" and "reason". 
This ideal was so plainly superior, it was 
supposed, thal it had only to be understood in 
order to be accepted by people of goodwill 
from all social classes. Its advocates were 
small groups of writers and speakers, fringe 
intellectuals and self-educated craftsmen, 
using the methods of propaganda and 
publicity to proclaim the truth. William Lane 
is the best known of them, more because of his 
weaknesses than his strengths. His emotional 
journalism accorded with the taste of the day; 
his conception of socialism was particularly 
innocuous — "Socialism  m eans the 
brotherhood of man, the union of all for the 
securing of social justice"; his exodus to 
P araguay  and subsequent life as a 
conservative newspaper editor could be used 
to demonstrate the absurdity of socialist 
doctrines. Other socialists of the time were 
made of sterner stuff.
By 1890 there was a labor movement in 
Australia as well as socialist ideas. This labor 
movement consisted of trade unions, mostly 
of skilled workers which, over thirty years, 
had won improvements in wages, hours and 
conditions by direct bargaining with 
employers. They did not confine themselves 
to simple economism; they made their voice 
heard in public affairs — on immigration, the 
White Australia policy, government works, 
access to farming land, education, and 
legislation to protect employees. Seeking a 
better place for labour in existing society, they 
emphasised their respectability, inscribing on 
their banners "Defence, not Defiance". But 
their proudest banner celebrated the Eight- 
Hour Day, a reduction in surplus value and 
hence profits which no employer gave 
willingly and many still refused.
The unions had been successful basically 
because of the relative shortage of labour in 
this developing but distant part of the British 
world economy. They were sure of their
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strength and confident about their future. So 
trade unions grew early and strongly in 
Australia, evolving a union consciousness 
which could lead to class consciousness. They 
were the potential mass audience for socialist 
ideas and even by 1890 some of the most 
active unionists were touched by socialism as 
an ideal.
A generation of prosperity ended suddenly 
in the early 1890s with a depression as severe 
and more prolonged than that of the 1930s. 
After a series of bitter strikes and lockouts, 
the trade unions were greatly reduced, though 
not destroyed. Turning to direct political 
action, they launched the class-conscious 
mass movement which created the Labor 
Party. The program of the Labor Party, as it 
was hammered out over ten years or more, 
had three com ponents: full po litica l 
democracy, trade union demands for the 
protection of labour, and Australian 
nationalism. Later, some social welfare 
provisions, such as old age pensions, were 
added and the national policies became more 
prominent.
The Labor Party was never a socialist 
party. Socialists had flung themselves into 
building it and had some influence on it in its 
early fluid years when socialist aspirations 
could be accepted as a distant objective. 
Genuine socialists were for ever thereafter 
confronted by the dilemma of whether they 
should work within a mass reformist party 
which did not seek more than palliatives, or 
stay outside it and risk becoming isolated.
I will not recount the comings and goings 
between the socialist groups and the Labor 
Party. Those who tried to influence the Labor 
Party were best represented by the Victorian 
Socialist Party which, under Tom Mann, 
became a political and intellectual force on 
the left. Those who stood outside the Labor 
Party found they could not win votes against 
it in elections, so became more doctrinaire in 
their hostility to the Labor Party and other 
socialists.
All these socialist groups took their theory 
from abroad, from Britain and the Second 
International. Their goal was some kind of
state  socialism , to  be achieved by 
parliamentary means, for which they sought 
to find the right kind of electoral strategy. 
They were all products of their time, marked 
by a narrow Australian nationalism, almost 
invariably racist in their support of the White 
Australia Policy, declaring the equality of 
women only as an abstract principle, 
sectarian in their attachment to dogmas 
which reflected their powerlessness to shape 
events. For all this they kept socialist ideas 
alive as an opposition to the dominant 
ideology and they were not wholly separated 
from class-conscious unionists, on whom they 
had some influence.
The frustration of the socialists, which 
seemed everlasting, was being resolved by 
1914. The Labor Party had to wait twenty 
years, to 1910, before it won office in the 
Commonwealth and New South Wales 
parliaments and was accepted as the 
alternative government in all states, forcing 
its conservative opponents to combine 
against it. What was the outcome of this first 
period of Labor in power? The reforms 
amounted to some industrial legislation to 
protect trade unionists, a little social welfare, 
a more comprehensive arbitration system, a 
modest land tax on large holdings and a weak 
Commonwealth Bank. More fundamentally, 
there was an all-round strengthening of the 
national government, accompanied by 
com pulsory military training and an 
Australian navy. Most of this program 
fo llo w e d  on fro m  e a r l ie r  L ib e ra l  
governments, as Labor became a consensus 
party. There was not much for the workers, 
not much to show for twenty years of rank- 
and-file devotion to building the party. Deep 
divisions were present in the Labor Party 
before the First World War.
Disillusioned militants turned to the IWW 
(the Industrial Workers of the World), the 
new force which revitalised class struggle in 
Australia, sweeping aside the old socialist 
groups unless they joined it. The doctrines of 
the IWW came from outside Australia, from 
the United States, but took root in this 
country because they made sense to class­
conscious workers. The IWW told the
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workers that they must constantly light the 
boss at the point of exploitation, on the job, 
by direct action and unity; that the state was 
run by governments in the interests of the 
ruling class, so must be defied and eventually 
smashed; that politics was a trap, the Labor 
Party bogus, arbitration a trick; that workers 
must rely on their own strength, in industrial 
unions. They declared:
The working class and the employing 
class have nothing in common .... 
Between these two classes a struggle 
must go on until the workers of the 
world organise as a class, take 
possession of the earth and the 
machinery of production, and abolish 
the wages system.
By 1917 World War I brought Australia to 
a crisis which crystallised around the two 
conscription referendums. Australia entered 
the war on a wave of patriotism and Empire 
loyalty which provided a flood of recruits for 
the Army. By 1917 feelings had changed. At 
home, unemployment spread, prices rose, 
living s tan d a rd s  fell, w ar p rofiteers
flourished, at the front the slaughter mounted 
with no end in sight. So Hughes, Holman and 
other Labor leaders joined with every voice of 
the ruling class to call for conscription. In two 
referendums in 1916 and 1917, conscription 
was rejected, despite the weight of the whole 
establishment for it, censorship, intimidation 
and prosecution of opponents under the war 
powers. It was a great victory for a mass 
movement which formed on class lines.
The IWW spearheaded th is mass 
movement. They completely opposed the war 
from the beginning. From the first, their 
slogan was: "Answer the declaration of war 
with a call for a general strike."
As Tom Barker, editor of Direct Action, 
put it simply:
Let those who own Australia do the 
fighting .... Workers of the World, 
unite! Don't become hired murderers! 
Don't join the army or navy!
The IWW was suppressed. They were 
prosecuted and jailed under the War 
Precautions Act, charged with treason, with 
conspiring to burn down business premises in 
Sydney (receiving sentences of up to fifteen 
years), leaders like Barker, who was born in 
England, were deported. Refusing to be silent 
and scorning to hide, the IWW stood up with 
great courage, defiant to the end.
By its nature the IWW could not be a tight 
and disciplined party which would organise 
and survive underground. So it was destroyed 
as an organisation. Yet its ideas of socialism 
did not disappear — neither its rejection of all 
capitalist ideology nor its method of militant 
industrial unionism. Reaction had not 
triumphed wholly. Lines had been drawn 
beyond which the rulers could not go: on 
conscription, or reduction of standards of 
living, on the right of workers to defend 
themselves through their trade unions.
A revolutionary turn
Although the revolutionary upsurge of 
World War I shook the ruling classes in many 
countries, only the Bolsheviks were able to 
seize and hold power. Their success was an
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inspiration for communist parties formed in 
other countries, as in Australia in 1920. On 
the one hand, the Australian Communist 
Party sought to model itself faithfully on the 
Bolsheviks; on the other, it was the heir to the 
Australian socialist tradition and had to live 
or die in the Australian environment. So from 
the beginning there was always tension 
between the outside theories and the local 
circumstances.
This was not new in Australian socialism — 
it had always been the case. It was particularly 
pronounced with the Communist Party 
because, now the road to socialism had been 
opened in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union 
must be defended against its enemies who 
would destroy it. The Third International 
centred there embodied the experience and 
wisdom  of the world w orking-class 
movement.
The Labor Party had been decimated after 
it split in 1916. Nevertheless it endured after 
shedding its right wirig, regained support, 
persisted as a more class-conscious, even 
embittered, party, adopting a hesitant 
Socialist Objective in 1921. The unions were 
prepared to strike in defiance of arbitration 
courts and governments to defend their 
conditions and move on to the offensive for a 
44-hour week. By the mid-1920s both Labor 
Party and unions had distanced themselves 
from the reviled Communist Party without 
rejecting socialism as the ultimate goal of 
their reforms. The old socialist groups 
withered, leaving the small Communist Party 
to carry on their tactics of publicity and 
propaganda on the outskirts of the labor 
movement. Despite its new name and 
doctrines the Communist Party could only 
continue the educational role which the 
earlier socialist groups had followed.
In fact, the influence of socialist ideas was 
ebbing by 1920. In the uneasy 1920s, 
conservative politics prevailed, repressive 
m e a su re s  by g o v e rn m e n ts  a g a in s t  
revolutionaries were institutionalised, a 
determined effort was made in every way to 
hold to the values of the past. This could not 
succeed. Britain was no longer the dominant 
imperialist power; it could not offer
prosperity or security to Australia. There, 
local manufacturing grew behind tariff 
p ro tection- com m erce, tran sp o rt and 
communications enlarged their scale with 
new technology; the primary industries and 
mining came more under the control of 
finance capital.
The national bourgeoisie was more 
diversified, less dependent on Britain for 
capital or migration, or even trade. The 
capitalists devised a network of government 
intervention for their protection and to win 
popular support. They could only go a certain 
distance with this: they could not break with 
dependence as a truly national bourgeoisie, 
nor provide either welfare or ideals which 
would bind the working class to them. 
Politically this was reflected in Australia's 
status as a self-governing dominion of the 
British Empire, and in the strength of the 
Labor Party, and culturally in a strong strand 
of A u s tra lia n  n a tio n a l feeling  and 
isolationism, side by side with Britishness.
In the crisis of the depression of the 1930s, 
the Scullin federal government, powerless 
against the hostile Senate and the bankers, 
agonised as it inexorably followed the dictates 
of the most powerful Australian and British 
capitalists to cut wages and welfare in order to 
restore profits. The story has often been told, 
so I will not give it here. The simple facts of 
hardship and desperation are overwhelming, 
when one in three were unemployed, often 
homeless and hungry, and all hopes of the 
future were swept away. In the shock and 
uncertainty, society was violently polarised, 
the m ajority  certain ly  accepting  the 
conservative answers, but a large part of the 
labor movement rejecting them and pinning 
their hopes for a little while on Jack Lang's 
brand of laborism.
Depression and socialism
Lang was no socialist, yet both instinct and 
cunning led him to denounce the British 
bondholders, the banks and the money power 
which battened on Australia. He dramatically 
presented himself as the fearless champion of 
the Australian people, not only the workers.
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When it came to the point he went quietly 
after his dismissal by the New South Wales 
Governor and, in his subsequent career, 
becam e a v iru le n t a n ti-c o m m u n is t. 
Nevertheless, large sections of the Labor 
Party had been radicalised. In 1931 the New 
South Wales State Conference of the Labor 
Party adopted a plan to achieve socialism in 
three years, which Lang managed to have 
reversed. The traumatic events of the early 
1930s, when capitalism seemed on the verge of 
collapse and fascist groups drilled to save it, 
strengthened socialist ideas inside and outside 
the Labor Party.
This was the third crisis which had shaken 
Australia since the 1880s, appearing 
superficially as disasters thrust on Australia 
from abroad. In fact, Australia's involvement 
in them arose from internal causes interwoven 
with its place in world capitalism, bringing to 
a head the contradictions in the mode of 
production, class relations and ideology 
within Australia. In the first, in the depression 
of the 1890s, the age of optimism ended and 
the employers triumphed over the unions, but 
the Labor Party was born. In the second, in 
World War I, the socialists were suppressed 
but the electors said no to conscription. In the 
third, capitalist answers to the depression 
were imposed, but a large part of the working 
class was radicalised.
So, although in each crisis the radical forces 
were defeated, at the same time the ruling 
class had been seriously challenged, forced to 
reconsider and change its methods of ruling, 
to accept a new relationship of class forces. 
Each left in its wake heightened working-class 
consciousness and a new form and force for 
socialist ideas.
For the rest of the J930s, socialist ideas 
were centred on the transformed Communist 
Party while extending far beyond it. By 1929 
the tiny Communist Party was abandoning 
hope of co-operation with Laboi leaders and 
turning to denounce them as social fascists 
against whom the workers must be organised 
to struggle. The communists had not been 
surprised by the depression, having always 
foretold a new crisis of capitalism. They 
opposed Lang as much as any labor leader
which, for some time, isolated them from 
many class-conscious workers. Then, from 
the early 1930s, the Communist Party grew in 
numbers, finding a base in the unemployed 
and the trade unionists who accepted militant 
leadership to restore their conditions. From 
the mid-1930s, communists in Australia, as 
elsewhere, worked for a united front to 
advance democracy and welfare at home and 
oppose the aggressive fascist powers abroad.
The socialism which the Communist party 
envisaged as its goal was centralised state 
socialism, as seen in the Soviet Union. The 
party tried to model itself on the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union; at least as depicted 
from Soviet sources, basing itself on 
democratic centralism which, in practice, 
meant tight party discipline and strict 
obedience to higher party bodies. Not that 
revolution in Australia was seen as an 
immediate possibility. The economic struggle 
was pursued through the trade unions where 
strikes and arbitration were combined and the 
driving force was the workshop party branch . 
In pursuit of the united front, co-operation of 
Labor Party and non-party workers was 
c o n s is te n t ly  so u g h t. M o re  w id e ly , 
communists organised broad movements 
against conservative governments and in 
defence of democratic liberties. They 
advocated collective security abroad against 
both subservience to Britian and Australian 
isolationism.
This was a comprehensive program 
combining industrial and political action 
directed by a unified party for both immediate 
and ultimate aims. It drew on democratic 
trad itio n s  to  inco rp o ra te  A ustra lian  
nationalism into the socialist movement and 
to promote a popular counter-culture. It 
proclaimed internationalism as more than an 
abstract principle, for the defence of peace, of 
Australia and, of course, of the Soviet Union. 
It provided both a philosophy and a guide to 
action in all spheres of social life, action which 
was proved effective as the Communist Party 
grew in numbers and force.
The outbreak of war in 1939 with the Soviet 
Union neutral under the German-Soviet Non- 
Aggression Pact cut across communist policy,
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leaving the party uncertain and soon to be 
made illegal, without being seriously 
damaged. Then, from mid-1941, with the 
Nazi attack on the Soviet Union and the 
Japanese threat to Australia, the communist 
policies of the 1930s were widely seen to have 
been vindicated, the appeasers and Menzies 
government completely discredited. All the 
allies joined in admiration of the Red Army. 
The Curtin government marshalled the 
country for an all-out war effort with a high 
level of national unity, wholeheartedly 
supported by the Communist Party and most 
of the left. The far-reaching controls imposed 
by the central government were accompanied 
by full employment, social security and the 
promise that a rising standard of living would 
continue after the war.
The largest socialist party
So, for a few short years, from 1941 to 1945, 
the largest socialist party Australia had seen 
was in firm alliance with a popular reforming 
g o v e rn m e n t,  an d  n a t io n a l is m  an d  
internationalism marched hand in hand. 
What would happen when the war was over? 
The Communist Party and socialists outside 
it hoped that the united front would continue, 
that the Labor government would carry out 
far-reaching reforms of capitalism, while also 
making for granted that there would be 
resistance from reactionary forces, there 
would be further economic crises and, out of 
these struggles, some time in the future, 
socialism would be won.
From their position of strength in the 
unions, the communists led large strikes for 
higher wages and the forty-hour week. The 
Labor Party sought industrial peace through 
a rb itra tio n , a p rospering  A ustra lian  
cap ita lism  m oderated  by governm ent 
controls and eased by welfare measures. 
Meanwhile, the first shots of the Cold War 
had been fired, the world was dividing into 
two camps and, despite Labor nationalism, 
there was no doubt Australia would be an ally 
of the United States, taking over from Britain.
1949 was a turning point, not only in 
Australia. The world capitalist economy was
entering a long period, twenty-five years and 
more, of expansion of the productive forces 
nowhere more visibly than in affluent 
Australia. Australia's growth and prosperity 
was comparable to that of the second half of 
the nineteenth century and with much the 
same foundations — an influx of capital and 
migrants, a strong demand for its exports, 
now particularly minerals. The capital came 
from the United States and Japan rather than 
Britain; the migrants were European as well 
as British, the markets were world-wide, with 
Japan's share rising. The scale of industry had 
grown, methods of production had been 
transformed, transnational firms were now 
dominant in the most profitable sectors and 
Australia remained a dependent economy 
integrated into their world strategies.
The working class was segmented by the 
diversity of migrants who filled the lowest 
levels, the opportunities for advancement 
open to old Australians and the drawing in of 
new sections, especially women, in a time of 
full employment. These changes were 
accompanied by a relentless offensive against 
any kind of socialist ideas or, indeed, any 
criticism from nationalists or liberals who 
defended older bourgeois principles. The 
Cold War was waged at home as well as 
abroad.
Under these circumstances, the influence of 
socialist ideas weakened. In 1949 the 
Communist Party had challenged the Labor 
Party for leadership of the working class, and 
failed. By now the socialist ideas shaped in the 
1930s had lost their force. The Communist 
Party tried to maintain itself by moderate 
industrial policies, concentrating its attack on 
American imperialism and the danger to 
world peace. In the long run, nothing could 
prevent its decline and splits which were part 
of the decline of the whole left in advanced 
capitalist countries. The splits were more 
effect than cause of its weakness. Since world 
socialism was now varied, not monolithic, 
with conflict between its parts, hope could be 
pinned on different overseas models, none of 
which convinced A u stra lian  w orkers. 
Socialists lamented the delay of the 
revolution in the West; apologists of
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capitalism celebrated the end of ideology, by 
which they meant the common acceptance of 
bourgeois practices.
Socialists were now divided. At one end of 
the spectrum, they turned to the Labor Party 
which had again purged itself of its extreme 
right wing in the split of the 1950s. Others 
emphasised trade union militancy which, in 
more confident days, they would have seen as 
mere economism. Some clung in increasing 
isolation to the earlier doctrines around 
which their consciousness had been formed. 
Among the growing number of intellectuals, 
students and young professionals, a New Left 
trend emerged, trenchantly criticising the 
narrowness of old socialist ideas without 
being able to formulate any agreed strategy or 
any which could command solid support.
Surviving Trotskyist groups had a new 
lease of life temporarily as their manifestoes 
seemed to offer an alternative. Since objective 
conditions were recalcitrant, emphasis was 
often placed on the power of a few to change 
the world by strength of will, a variety of Left 
Wing Communism. The Australian working 
class was now sometimes written off as 
innately reactionary, the reverse of earlier 
optimistic beliefs that it was inherently 
progressive.
This fragmentation of the socialists was, on 
the one hand, marked by a search for new 
ways forward; on the other, by disputes and 
doctrinaire attitudes, characteristics of 
revolutionaries in a non-revolutionary period 
which they could not change. This is not to 
disparage the courage with which they stood 
up to decades of attack and persecution, nor 
to see these years as simply a wasteland.
Socialists had been dispersed but they had 
not disappeared. They led such powerful 
movements as that against the Viet Nam War 
and such continuing ones as the radical 
women's movement, those against racism and 
the ravages of capitalism on environmental 
conditions of life. They spearheaded the trade 
unions' defence of their members' needs and 
refusal to be shackled by arbitration courts or 
employers. Ideologically, the battles never 
ceased and, out of them a wide, richer, more
complex understanding of socialist theory as 
a tool of analysis was built up.
In this period, for the first time, marxism as 
a body of knowledge became widely 
available, its concepts permeating, even if in a 
diluted form, the way in which the world was 
seen not only by activists but by ordinary 
people. It was necessary that, during this 
period, socialists should give much of their 
effort to contesting the hegemony of capitalist 
ideology. To a degree, intellectual leadership
— I don't just mean pronouncements by 
prominent intellectuals — was won away 
from the establishment which wielded power 
despite the acceptance of the status quo in 
practical matters.
By the mid-1970s the long period of 
expansion of world capitalism was coming to 
an end and there could be no possibility of 
Australia being exempt from this decline 
regardless of the wishful thinking of the 
boomsters. So new class conflicts emerged. 
Immediately, defence of the material gains of 
the previous period becomes the starting 
point of mass action. In many other ways, 
in te rn a tio n a l as well as local, new 
contradictions are bringing forth new 
responses.
What can we say in review? Above all, that 
socialist ideas and action for them are part of 
Australia's history. For a century, socialists 
have been the vanguard of opposition to the 
ruling classes. The record is in no way a simple 
success story of growing strength and 
impending victory. On the contrary, the 
socialist movement is in many respects 
weaker than it has been on occasions in the 
past. N or is it merely a narrative of gains and 
losses, of advances and retreats. The class 
struggle does not follow a straight path. We 
know that the working class does not 
determine events but we should also 
remember that the ruling class does not rule 
untrammelled. We always have a dialectic of 
class relationships, whether we are looking at 
the economy, political power or ideological 
hegemony, and the labor movement and 
socialism are part of past, present and future 
society in Australia.
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The Red 
North
by Carmel Shute
PUT NEW
LIFE INTO THE
Vote for the Q Communist
( w o r k e r  W eekly^ 25 March 1938),
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In the popular imagination the state of 
Queensland is now the "Deep North". It is 
regarded by many "southerners" as a bastion 
of provincialism and unswerving reaction 
where antipathy towards leftist or even liberal 
viewpoints becomes more pronounced as one 
heads into the Tropics. It appears as if it's 
always been so.
Like all mythologies, this view of 
Queensland has a certain basis in reality. The 
Bjelke-Petersen government is reactionary 
and it actively fosters a nasty type of 
provincialism whose primary function is to 
disguise its sell-out to transnational capital. 
Some, perhaps quite a few, Queenslanders, 
also share the government's views. But the 
pervasiveness of this mythology also rests on 
prejudice and a widespread ignorance of 
Queensland history.
How many Australians, indeed how many 
Queenslanders, today know that the stretch of 
Queensland from Mackay to Cairns was once 
"The Red North"? As a "southerner", that is, 
an inhabitant of the south-eastern corner of 
the state — and also a history student at the 
University of Queensland in the early 1970s, I 
certainly never had an inkling of the 
outstanding anti-fascist campaigns and 
industrial struggles waged in the north in the 
1930s and '40s.
It was only through later contact with the 
"Old Left" in Brisbane that I heard tales of 
"The Red North" and I must confess that I 
was sometimes inclined to relegate these 
accounts to the realm of leftwing mythology. 
This view changed with the publication of 
material around the time of the Communists 
and the Labour Movement Conference in 
1980.* However, it was not until I obtained a 
copy of Diane Menghetti's recently published 
book, The Red North, that I could fully 
appreciate the extent to which North
The Red North: The Popular Front in North 
Queensland by Diane Menghetti, History 
Department, James Cook University, 1981. 227 
pp. $5from the History Department or $7.50from 
bookshops.
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Queensland in the 1930s and '40s led the rest 
of A ustra lia  in its com m itm ent to 
internationalism, and the strength and 
breadth of its working-class organisations.
M enghetti's  book focuses on the 
communist-led "Red Front" in the period 
1935 to 1940. The North Queensland 
Communist Party actually achieved its 
greatest strength and influence later in the 
1940s but, as The Red North makes clear, its 
successes in that decade are impossible to 
understand without a thorough analysis of 
how communists worked in the northern 
region of Queensland in the 1930s.
The "bolshevisation" of the CPA in the late 
1920s and early '30s had had a devastating 
impact on the fledgling North Queensland 
organisation. Ted Tripp, the local communist 
leader, was purged and the adoption of a rigid 
"social fascist" line towards the Australian 
Labor Party (ALP) had decimated or 
extinguished a number of CPA branches. The 
"social fascist" line was relaxed after Hitler 
came to power in 1933 and communists were 
able to win increasing support for their 
militancy in the mines and on the canefields. 
Under the capable leadership of Jack Henry, 
a cane-cutter, and Fred Paterson, a barrister, 
the CPA in North Queensland was in the 
process of recovering by the mid-1930s.
However, its rapid growth from 1935 was 
the result of more complex factors: greater 
opportunities for industrial militancy; a 
conservative state Labor government and an 
even more conservative leadership in the 
Australian Workers' Union, both remote 
from the realities of life in the north; the 
presence of large migrant groupings which 
became increasingly active in response to the 
rise of fascism in Europe; the evolution of a 
distinctively "indigenous" style of political 
work; and the creative application of a 
"united front" policy.
The decision to form a "united front" of the 
working class was not formally taken by the 
Queensland branch of the CPA until January 
1936. This decision, of course, was very much 
in keeping with the declaration of the 
Comintern the previous year to subordinate 
world communist activities to the fight
against international fascism. As Menghetti 
points out, this "new line was scarcely more 
appropriate to Australian conditions than its 
p re d e c e s s o r ;  n e i th e r  'r e v o lu t io n a ry  
conditions' nor 'fascist threat' provided an 
adequate description of the realities of the 
political situation in this country." (p.2 1 )
However, it did allow Party policy and 
trade union policy to be determined more or 
less nationally and, most importantly, 
stressed the necessity of co-operating with 
social democratic forces. In any case, 
communists in North Queensland had started 
to build a "united front" well before the policy 
was formally initiated. They were also in the 
process of extending this to a "popular front" 
which included "intellectuals", "working 
farmers" and small shop-keepers.
Turning point — 1935 sugar strike
The real turning point was the Weil's 
Disease strike of 1935 which has been 
immortalised in Jean Devanny's novel Sugar 
Heaven. Weil's Disease was the popular name 
given to fevers caused by three varieties of 
leptospirae which were prevalent in northern 
sugar areas in the 1930s. The virus was spread 
by rats urinating on wet ground or cane 
stalks, and sometimes proved fatal. Burning 
the cane before harvesting was the only 
known method of preventing its spread. 
H ow ever, burn ing  was opposed by 
canegrowers on the grounds that the sugar 
content of the cane was reduced and that 
some stands would be lost completely if not 
harvested immediately after the burn — 
despite a clause in the sugar workers' award 
which specified lower rates for workers 
harvesting burnt cane.
At the beginning of the 1935 crushing 
season, the Australian Workers' Union had 
won an agreement to burn the cane in the 
Ingham district only. In all other areas, cane 
was to be burnt only on the written order of a 
health inspector. Fear of Weil's disease was 
intense and heightened by the discovery of 
infected rats in the Cairns and Innisfail 
districts. The sugar workers were mostly 
seasonal workers, not afraid to take militant 
action for short-term gains. Meetings,
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initially called by communists in the industry, 
quickly voted to declare all unburnt cane 
"black". Within a few weeks, more than 2,000 
cutters and 1,000 mill-hands had struck. 
Menghetti argues that the efficiency and 
speed with which the separate districts were 
organised suggests that "the Communist 
Party had orchestrated the strike in advance 
of the season", (p.34) The Brisbane Trades 
and Labor Council certainly thought so, for it 
passed a reso lu tion  condem ning the 
Communist Party for its tactics, and the 
rightwing leadership of the AWU, of course, 
opposed the action.
It was a bitter strike lasting for two months: 
the industrial court ordered secret ballots and 
cancelled all cane-cutting agreements in the 
Mourilyan area; the AWU used strong-arm 
tactics; 150 police were sent up from Brisbane; 
striking cutters were evicted from their 
quarters and scab labour was widely 
employed. The strike was defeated though, in 
July 1936, a general order for burning the 
cane before harvesting was handed down by 
the industrial court. Nevertheless, as 
Menghetti shows, the strike was, in many 
senses, a victory for the working class. The 
struggle was an extremely broad one 
involving entire communities in the north. It 
drew in normally apolitical groups like 
women and migrants, and even won the 
support of many small shop-keepers and a 
number of the smaller growers who were, 
themselves, often former cutters.
Italian workers
The AWU refused to provide relief and its 
policy was to divide strikers into the smallest 
possible groups and then conduct secret 
ballots. Communists, in contrast, stressed 
rank-and-file control, unity of the four mill 
areas and were prominent in organising relief 
kitchens and accommodation. And, unlike 
the AWU which regarded the sizeable 
numbers of Italian workers as communist 
dupes who could not understand the issues or 
"our language", Communist Party members 
recognised Italians as fellow workers whose 
rights had to be respected. Communist 
activists always ensured that leaflets were
available in Italian and that Italian workers 
addressed meetings as well as translating 
speeches. Meanwhile, the AWU still upheld 
its 1930 "preference agreement" with the 
Australian Sugar Producers' Association and 
the Queensland Cane Growers' Council 
which allowed migrant workers to compose 
no more than 25 percent of mill workers and 
cutters.
Menghetti argues that it was in the relief 
kitchens that the- differences between the 
approaches of the AWU and CPA became 
most apparent. Relief committees were set up 
in all local centres and sought the broadest 
possible support — from the shop-keepers, 
small farmers (often Italian in origin), the 
miners of Collinsville and the "progressive" 
section of the Queensland public. Women 
became active on relief committees organising 
entertainment (the men did the cooking) and 
Italian migrants were, for the first time, 
involved both socially and politically. Italian 
gang cooks ran the Mourilyan relief kitchen 
and the novelist Jean Devanny reports that 
the militant cooks "harangued" the men in 
Italian as they ate. The taste of Italian food 
was not, however, nearly so novel as- the 
"almost unprecedented sight of Australian 
girls with Italian men", (p.57)
Despite iso la tion , poor educational 
standards and the apathy of the ALP, 
communists and anti-fascists were able to use 
the skills and support they had gained during 
the strike to mount a powerful solidarity 
campaign when the Spanish war broke out in 
1936. Of the twenty-one branches of the 
Spanish Relief Committee set up throughout 
Australia, sixteen were in North Queensland; 
of the twenty-eight Australians who went to 
fight in Spain, nine were from the region. 
D espite low wages and w idespread 
unemployment, large sums were raised to aid 
the Spanish Republicans. Support for the 
campaign was so strong that in Ingham only 
two families were reported as having refused 
to donate. The b ro ad er an ti-fascist 
movement, which waxed and waned "down 
south", was similarly energetic in North 
Queensland. The first Australian anti-fascist 
demonstration in Australia, in fact, occurred
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in the tiny sugar town of Halifax in 1925. 
After 1935, anti-fascist migrants, including 
anarchists, achieved "a new level of co­
operation'' with the Communist Party which, 
in turn, increasingly won Italians, Yugoslavs 
and Spaniards to its ranks, (p.85) Italian anti­
fascist clubs in northern towns affiliated 
nationally and by 1939 were numerous and 
strong enough to hold a co-ordinating 
conference in Townsville.
Women's movement
The Weil's Disease strike of 1935 gave, 
perhaps, an even more dramatic fillip to the 
women's movement in North Queensland. 
Menghetti argues that its strength and 
independence was somewhat of a paradox 
since "neither local Party members nor the 
northern community in general were more 
liberal in their attitudes towards women than 
other Australians", (p.95) She suggests a 
number of explanations for this (including 
Jack Henry's "shyness of women" (p.96) but 
only a few seem pertinent. The movement's 
founders were the wives of strikers who 
themselves had taken the initiative in 1935 in 
Innisfail to form the first Women's Progress 
Club; there was no "directive from the District 
Committee", (p.96) The burgeoning women's 
movement was also strongly influenced by 
Jean Devanny, a militant feminist and 
communist "w ith. some standing in the 
southern Party" (p.96) and it may also have 
benefited from the more relaxed, less 
authoritarian attitudes to organisation in the 
north.
After Jean Devanny's tour in 1935 (on be­
half of the Movement Against War and 
Fascism), Women's Progress Clubs prolifer­
ated throughout the region. Officially, "non­
sectarian" and "non-party", they were 
n e v e r th e le s s  h e a v ily  in f lu e n c e d  by 
communists or the wives of communists. 
After 1937, the Clubs sent delegates to the 
annual District Conferences of the CPA and 
their activities often reflected CPA policies. 
Politically, Menghetti says, the Clubs were a 
"fairly typical front" (p. 100) but displayed "an 
unusual degree of independence for a 
con tem porary  w om en's o rgan isa tion".
(p. 101) They interspersed their political 
activities with both feminist agitation and 
"traditional pursuits" — hospital visiting, 
exhibitions of horticulture and handicraft, 
and arranging social functions. This 
approach was so successful in Collinsville that 
representatives of the Ladies Home League 
and the Ladies Hospital Guild were out in 
force for the arrival of J.B. Miles, the CPA 
National Secretary, in July 1936. The 
Collinsville Country Women's Association 
(CWA) sent a representative to CPA 
conferences, and in 1942 the Gladstone CWA 
circulated a petition calling on the federal 
government to lift the ban on the Communist 
Party.
At least among working-class people, such 
activities gradually eroded the image of the 
Communist Party as "sinister and foreign", 
(p. 109) The CPA was the driving force behind 
the Unemployed Workers' Union and helped 
provide much of the practical assistance 
which enabled working people to survive the 
Depression. Menghetti asserts that another
important factor in weakening the "Red 
Bogey" in the north was "the unusually 
extensive social life of the Party", (pp. 115- 
116) Dances, balls, card parties, picnics, 
bazaars and discussion groups provided 
entertainment throughout the region — 
though some of these activities (such as the 
Spanish Relief Queen competition) may now 
seem ideologically suspect.
Crucial in promoting the work of the CPA 
was the large number of local bulletins and, 
after May 1937, the North Queensland 
Guardian, edited by Fred Paterson. The 
paper adopted a consciously broad approach: 
it omitted the ritualistic hammer and sickle 
from its banner; it sought (and obtained) 
advertisements from local shop-keepers; it 
stressed the compatibility of Christianity and 
communism; and it included "Turf News", a 
children's column and a women's section as 
well as covering international, national and 
local events.
By the late 1930s, North Queensland was the 
biggest "red" area outside the Sydney district. 
Its electoral support increased, the CPA often
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working closely with the ALP in contesting 
elections. As early as 1936, Fred Paterson 
won 81.1 percent of the state vote in 
Collinsville but it was not until 1939 that he 
was elected to the Townsville Council and, at 
the same time, Jim Henderson became a 
councillor for the Collinsville Division of the 
Wagaratta Shire. (In 1944 Fred Paterson 
became the Member of Parliament for 
Bowen, the first and only Australian 
communist to win such a distinction.)
Later in 1939, the communist-led "Red 
Front" suffered a sharp and sudden demise 
upon the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact and 
the Soviet invasion of Finland: not even the 
well-integrated North Queensland Party 
could withstand two such shocks in the 
international situation. The position was 
exacerbated in 1940 when the Menzies 
government banned the Communist Party. A 
number of Italian communists were interned 
and Menghetti remarks that "the story of the 
internees and the political violence they faced 
in the camps, and of the hostility of local 
communities towards their wives and children 
who struggled to maintain the family farms, 
has yet to be told", (p. 162)
After the German invasion of the USSR, 
su p p o rt fo r the C PA  grew  ag a in . 
Nevertheless, anti-fascist migrants remained 
in internment camps and the North 
Queensland Guardian was never again 
published. Menghetti's excellent account 
ends there, the spectacular growtn of the 
CPA and the "Red Front" in North 
Queensland after the lifting of the ban in 
December 1942 remains untold. It is to be 
hoped that Menghetti — or another student 
from James Cook University — will continue 
the work.
The Red North is, I believe, one of the most 
important books ever to be published about 
Australian communist history. Unfortun­
ately, it will not be as widely read as it deserves 
because of James Cook University's limited 
distribution system. This is a great shame for 
so much of the experience of the "Red Front" 
is politically pertinent today. The Red North
avoids the institutional approach of Alastair 
Davidson's The Communist Party o f  
Australia and Robin Gollan's Revolut­
ionaries and Reformists, and gives the best 
account, so far, of how communists worked 
and lived in their own communities. The book 
is not without one or two problems, of course. 
It concentrates on the sugar-growing areas to 
the neglect of the mining communities of 
Collinsville and Scotsville, and contains a 
few errors, for example, the foundation date 
of the Union of Australian Women is given as 
the later war years and the terms "united 
front" and "popular front" are used 
interchangeably. Greater use of the actual 
words of the communists interviewed for the 
book would have made for a more lively text 
and it is a pity that the research (originally 
undertaken for an honours thesis) wasn't 
supplemented by interviews with North 
Queensland communists living "down south", 
for example, Ted Bacon, George Bliss, Alice 
Hughes, Dick Annear and Albert Robinson 
(who died in 1980).
The Red North also raises more questions 
than it can possibly answer. Why was the 
"popular front" so popular in North 
Queensland as opposed to other parts of 
Australia? Why did the Communist Party 
there achieve a degree of "naturalisation" and 
integration unheard of in the rest of the 
nation? What caused the disintegration of the 
"popular front" and the CPA in the north in 
the early 1950s? Why is there only one branch 
of the Communist Party north of Brisbane
now when the Cairns district alone had 
seventy during the war years? What happened 
to all those North Queensland communists, 
those "useful people", as Menghetti calls 
them? (p. 165) Have they been obliterated 
from history as cleanly as Fred Paterson's 
name was removed from the Townsville park 
built in his honour in 1944? Menghetti 
concludes that the "Red Front" was likely to 
have produced "more substantial long-term 
gains for the community than for the Party"
— and this, of course, is how it should be. She 
reminds us, too, somewhat sadly, of Jack 
Henry's words: "It was not lost; no, nothing is 
ever lost", (p. 166)
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Mining's Demand for 
Manufactured Inputs
Late in 1981, the Bureau of Industry 
Economics (BIE) finally reported on its study 
of the prospective demand by the mining 
sector of the Australian economy for 
commodities produced by manufacturing 
industries.1 The study was of "backward 
linkages" between mining and manufacturing 
only; it did not consider "forward linkages", 
that is existing and prospective supplies of 
Australian minerals to local processing and 
fabricating industries. Nonetheless, it is an 
important study in a number of respects. It 
provides careful predictions in place of rather 
opaque information, such as that garnered by 
W.D. Scott & Co. in relation to expansion by 
Hamersley Holdings Ltd ,2 and in place of 
guesswork and reference to experience in 
other countries. It is important, also, in that it 
indicates how relatively unimportant are the 
mining sector's backward linkages in 
comparison with value added in the mining 
sector itself.3 The bulk of the value added is to 
be found in the gross operating surpluses of 
the mining corporations.
The recent BIE study
The study covers prospective developments 
in the mining of black coal, iron ore and 
uranium, and in the extraction of oil and gas. 
According to the BIE in 1980, the prospect for 
the decade of the 1980s included an increase in 
the capacity of black-coal mining of 
approximately 120 percent (involving a total 
expenditure on open-cut mining alone, with
by Gavan Butler
associated infrastructure, of some $6,813 
million in 1979-1980 prices), two new iron-ore 
mines adding about 15 percent to capacity 
(and costing a total of $820 million), the 
development of uranium mines at Ranger, 
Yeelirrie, Beverly, Honeymoon, Koongarra, 
Roxby Downs, Lakeway, Ben Lomond and 
Jabiluka (involving a total of $5,850 million 
plus $1,525 million for the liquefaction plant 
adjacent to the North-West Shelf). The total 
capital cost of the projects mentioned, during 
the 1980s, was estimated to be about $17,500 
million in 1979-80 prices, of which nearly 
$4,000 million was thought likely to be 
required for infrastructure in the way of 
towns, rail and port facilities, pipe-lines, etc. 
The BIE considered that the identified 
projects would constitute about 75 percent 
(by value) of all mining developments likely 
during the 1980s. The total prospective 
investment in the mining sector was thought 
likely to amount to a maximum of 2.0 percent 
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by the 
mid-1980s, which is slightly higher than the 
previous peak of 1.6 percent in 1970-71.
The point of the BIE's exercise was to 
estimate the impact of the developments it 
identified on Australian manufacturing 
industries. That is, it was concerned with the 
m ining sec to r's  d irec t dem ands for 
manufactured inputs during both the 
construction and subsequent operation of the 
projects, plus the impact more generally of 
any increased capacity within the direct 
supplying industries. The procedures the
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BIE used for these estimations merit some 
consideration, if only to clarify some 
problems which should lead one to be 
cautious about the results of the study.
Estimates of the direct demands for 
manufactured inputs during construction 
were derived as follows: "In the case of open- 
cut coal, the pattern of input requirements 
was derived from information provided by 
the Broken Hill Proprietary Company 
Limited for the Gregory coal development in
Central Queensland .... Engineering data 
provided by the Bureau of Mineral 
Resources, Geology and Geophysics was used 
to determine the inputs for iron ore and 
uranium. The necessary information for oil 
and gas developments was provided by Esso 
Australia Ltd, Oil Drilling and Exploration 
Limited and the Bureau of Mineral 
Resources. The patterns of input usage 
assocated with five of the six infrastructure 
activities were also derived from the 
re q u ire m e n t o f the G reg o ry  coal 
development. For trunk gas and liquid 
pipelines, the input usage was based on 
information provided by the pipeline 
authority." (Report, p.23.)
That is, (i) the BIE generalised the 
requirements of what it considers to be 
"typical projects", and (ii) for information on 
the "typical projects" it depended on 
particular operating companies, whose 
executives would have known that the results 
of the study would be political data.
Estimates of direct requirements for 
manufactured inputs during mine operation 
and of the impact on manufacturing of 
expanded capacity and production within the 
supplying industries required the use of input- 
output tables compiled by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS). These are tables 
which relate the output of each of a number of 
industries with outputs of other industries 
which are inputs into the first industry. Partly 
because of a perverse decision of the Fraser 
government to give a low priority to ABS 
work input-output tables, the most recent 
data available to the BIE was for 1975-75. the 
BIE does claim to have been able to
incorporate in its computations some changes 
(for example, in labour productivity) during 
the period 1975-76 to 1979-80; but no such 
claim can be made with respect to, for 
example, trends within various industries in 
the proportions of locally produced to 
imported inputs.
The results of the study
The general result of the study is that, by 
the end of the 1980s, the impact on GDP of 
the operations involved in the various 
projects identified will be much larger than 
the impact of developing or constructing the 
projects, (see Table 1.)
The average impact on the manufacturing 
sector represents only about 2.3 percent of 
total production in the manufacturing sector 
in 1979-80. However, the prospective effect 
on three industries is much greater than the 
effect on manufacturing as a whole: about 40 
percent of the increased expenditure would be 
for construction, earthmoving and materials- 
handling equipment, for locomotives and 
rolling stock, and for industrial machinery 
and equipment. The average impact on the 
construction industry itself would represent 
about four percent of value added in that 
industry in 1979-80, while the average impact 
on transport would represent about 2.5 
percent. The average impact on the rest of the 
Australian economy would represent a little 
more than one percent of the relevant value 
added in 1979-80. Apparently only about 10 
percent of expenditure would be on imported 
inputs. It is to be noted that the impact of the 
mining developments on the value of the 
Australian dollar in terms of overseas 
currencies was not considered in the BIE 
study.
Of course, each of the different sorts of 
mining development would have (or will 
have) a different impact on each of the sectors 
of activity mentioned above. So, for example, 
the impact of expanding capacity to mine coal 
by the open-cut method would be greatest in 
the fields of co n stru c tio n  and the 
manufacture of earth-moving machinery and 
equipment and of industrial machinery and
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equipment, whereas for the development of 
off-shore oil and gas reserves, the greatest 
impact would be on the construction and 
transport sectors.
The BIE study also included consideration 
of the employment likely to be generated by 
the developments selected. The estimates are 
set out in Table 2. Given the scenario chosen 
by the BIE, the maximum employment would 
be generated in the mid-1980s. The peak of 
em p lo y m en t w ould  be re flec ted  in 
construction, transport and storage, in 
wholesaling and retailing (19,000), in 
"business services" of various sorts (9,000) 
and in the manufacture of basic metals and 
fab rica ted  m etal p ro d u c ts , tran sp o rt 
equipment, and other machinery and 
equipment. Only in transport and storage, 
apart from mining itself, would employment 
continue to grow throughout the 1980s. The 
BIE was careful to point out that the figures 
presented in Table 2 do not reflect likely net 
add itions to  em ploym ent in various 
industries: some existing mines will be closed 
down during the 1980s, and such closures will 
affect the number of jobs not only in the 
mining sector itself but in other activities.
The demand for minerals 
during the 1980s
Behind the BIE's selection of likely mining 
developments lie a number of predictions 
ab o u t w hat will happen  w ithin the 
international economy during the 1980s. The 
most important of these predictions was that 
the price of crude oil would remain at about 
the same level it had attained by 1979-80. 
Second, Japan and several of the economies 
of South-East Asia were predicted to grow at 
significant rates ("to record sound growth"). 
The first general prediction clearly has a 
bearing on the demand for steaming coal, oil 
and gas, and uranium. The second also has a 
bearing on the demand for energy resources; 
and it has a bearing on the demand for iron 
ore and coking coal. It is to be noted that the 
BIE admitted that its forecast for the 
development of uranium mines during the 
1980s might well prove to have been 
optimistic.
Since the conclusion of the BIE study, the 
relative price of crude oil has fallen and 
recession in the international economy has 
been confirmed. The Department of Industry 
and Commerce has reappraised the prospects 
for various resource developments but has yet 
to publish the results of the reappraisal. In the 
meantime, some relevant information has 
been published by the Australian Federation 
of Construction Contractors (AFCC ).4 The 
BIE estimated that the peak of construction 
activity associated with its selection of mining 
developments would occur in the mid-1980s; 
in September 1981, the AFCC predicted that 
the peak in construction activity would occur 
in 1983-84; but in March 1982, the AFCC 
predicted that the peak would occur in 1982- 
83. Among the projects included in the BIE 
study, the plant for processing gas from the 
North-West shelf for export to Japan has 
been deferred, as has been the expensive 
development of coal-mining facilities at Hail 
Creek in Queensland. It appears also, from 
the AFCC report, that the Roxby Downs 
project for the mining of copper, gold and 
uranium will shortly be deferred. An article in 
the Journal o f  Australian Political Economy 
of June 1981 confirms that the BIE was 
indeed optimistic in its predictions for 
uranium mining during the 1980s.5 However, 
it is not the questions of whether particular 
developments will be deferred, or for how 
long, that are central to these Notes; the 
question is rather that of the impact of mining 
developments if and when they do proceed.
Table 1 indicates that, in the BIE's scenario, 
approximately 65 percent of all value added 
in the Australian economy as a result of the 
mining developments would accrue within the 
mining sector itself. This figure is an average 
for the decade ot the 1980s; by the late 1980s 
the proportion would rise, in fact, to 75 
percent. What this means is that how the 
value added in the mining sector itself is 
distributed is substantially more important in 
determining the overall impact of the 
developments on the rest of the Australian 
economy than backward linkages are likely to 
be (at any rate, under the present 
government's policies as they relate to such 
linkages).
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Value added is distributed between wages 
and salaries, profits, depreciation allowances 
and taxes. Let us imagine that each of the 
15,234 extra persons expected by the BIE to 
be employed in the mining sector by the late 
1980s according to its scenario were to be paid 
$30,000 per year (in 1979-80 dollars). That 
would represent an addition to the mining 
sector's wage payments of some $457 million. 
Such a figure would account for almost 
exactly 7 percent of the additional value 
added expected to accrue to mining in the late 
1980s — but only 7 percent.
As is well known, there are special taxation 
concessions applying to mining companies. 
Many that were removed by the Whitlam 
government were subsequently reintroduced 
by the first Fraser government. These 
concessions relate to the treatment for tax 
purposes of expenditure on plant for mining, 
exploration and selected transportation: their 
effect is more generous to the companies 
concerned than are the normal depreciation 
allowances. The reintroduced concessions 
were subsequently augmented by a provision 
whereby the various "eligible" expenditures 
incurred in the exploration and development 
of oil and gas fields can be written off against 
income derived from any source. The effect of 
the various concessions available to mining 
companies during the earlier mining boom of 
the late 1960s was to reduce the proportion of 
tax paid by the companies to their gross 
operating surplus (including depreciation, 
dividends, interest, land rent and royalties 
paid to the states) to 14 percent or about half 
the proportion paid by companies in other 
sectors.6 By the second half of the 1970s, it 
appears that the proportion had risen to 
about 30 percent, which was slightly higher 
than the proportions obtaining in most other 
sectors. It is to be stressed, however, that no 
account is taken in these calculations of the 
possibility that apparent gross operating 
surpluses can be reduced by transfer pricing 
and that the practice of this procedure may be 
expected to be more common in the mining 
sector. On the other hand, companies in the 
mining sector pay royalties to state 
governments whereas no such payments are
made by companies in other sectors.
If there is another boom in mining 
investment in the 1980s, the proportion of 
company taxation to companies' gross 
operating surpluses can be expected to decline 
again. A proportion of 30 percent in the late 
1980s would yield revenue by way of company 
tax of approximately $1,800 million in 1979- 
BO prices, given the BIE's scenario, whereas a 
proportion of 15 percent would yield a mere 
$900 million out of an anticipated additional 
$6,000 million in gross operating surpluses. 
The majority of the remainder would take the 
form of profits to be distributed as dividends 
or retained, of interest, and of depreciation 
allowances. This portion of the value added in 
the mining sector itself would swamp the total 
of additional gross operating surplus in all 
other industries which, according to the BIE 
scenario, would feel the impact of the 
expansion of mining.7
In fact, the BIE concluded as follows: "The 
correct conclusion is that the benefits (of 
mineral developments) will be substantial but 
only a modest proportion will be distributed- 
through the linkages between industries 
associated with the development and 
operation of the mines. The major impact will 
flow through the distribution of income 
generated within the mining industry itself (as 
between taxes, after-tax profits, depreciation 
and wages)." (p.75)
In this context, a number of issues become 
immensely important. They are (i) the 
guidelines for foreign investment, which have 
been progressively relaxed by successive 
Fraser governments, (ii) the justifiability of 
special taxation concessions to companies 
engaged in mining and, indeed, of the 
"normal" depreciation provisions of the 
Income Assessment Act as they apply to 
mining companies, (iii) the identity of the 
institutions lending to the mining companies, 
the rates at which they are paid interest, and 
the distribution of the profits of the lending 
institutions, and, of course, (iv) the incidence 
of transfer pricing. These issues are expressed 
in a different way in the concluding remarks.
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There is a set of contracts under which the 
operations of mining are carried out. There 
are those between the mining companies, 
unions and the state which determine the 
levels of wages, salaries and supplements. 
These contracts are explicit and implicit: the 
implicit contracts relate to the determination 
of overaward payments as against awards. 
There are other explicit contracts between 
borrowers and lenders and between mining 
companies and the state governments which 
issue them leases; and there are implicit 
contracts in regard to rates of dividends paid 
by the mining companies and bonuses 
payable by life assurance companies which 
have invested in or lent to the mining sector. 
And there are broader, implicit politico- 
economic contracts that are not commonly 
identified as such.
Mineral resources are owned by the people. 
In principle, companies exploiting the 
resources do so on behalf of the people; and 
the state acts as the agent of the people in 
estab lish ing  agreem ents with certain  
com panies. Im plicit po litico-econom ic 
contracts are made between the mining 
companies and both state and federal 
governments. In entering a contract each 
company — .or each industry — accepts 
certain terms. Those terms may cover the 
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1. Bureau of Industry Economics, Mining 
Developments and Australian Industry: input 
demands during the 1980s, Research Report No. 9, 
AGPS, Canberra 1981.
2. According to Susan Bambrick, Australian 
Minerals and Energy Policy (Canberra: ANU 
Press, 1979), p. 208, it appeared that 89 percent of 
the expenditure involved in the expansion of 
Iiamersley's facilities was to be for work done in 
Australia. However, it may have been simply the 
proportion of contract expenditure accounted for 
by firms registered in Australia, perhaps mere 
assemblers.
3. Value added is the value of sales of output by the 
enterprises involved in the sector less the value of 
materials purchased from other enterprises.
4. The most recent information is reported in the 
Australian Financial Review, March 29, 1982. See 
Peter Simonds, "Outlook Worsens for Spin-otls
degree of local equity and the maximum 
period which can elapse before a company is 
"naturalised" (that is, before it becomes more 
than 50 percent locally owned); they may 
cover e x p o r tin g , p ro te c tio n  o f the 
environment, taxation, or royalties. A state 
government might also attach conditions to 
mining leases prescribing the extent to which 
minerals would be processed locally; or a 
federal government might attach conditions 
to export licences which would prescribe the 
extent to which plant and equipment used in 
mining would be purchased from local 
suppliers.
Under successive Fraser governments, 
mining companies contracting to exploit 
Australian mineral resources have had to 
accept only relatively weak conditions, which 
is hardly surprising. Under the terms of the 
contracts that have been made, the bulk of the 
income generated in mining accrues to a few 
larg e  c o rp o ra tio n s , m ost of them  
transnational, which are subsequently bound 
by almost no restrictions on what they do with 
that income. It is time that the old contracts 
were torn up and time that the mining 
companies were expected to accept stringent 
conditions or to vacate the mining sector in 
favor of public enterprises.
from Resources Boom".
5. Jim Falk, 'The Political Economy of the 
Nuclear Industry", JAPE, No 10, June 1981, pp. 
47-64.
6. Australian Treasury, Resource Development: 
Maximising Opportunities, Treasury Economic 
Paper, No 8, Canberra, AGPS, 1981, p.19.
7. In 1975-76, the ratioof gross operating surpluses 
to wages, salaries and supplements paid by
J 6 4 2  ,mining sector enterprises was "9Q9" ’
3389,
whereas in manufacturing the ratio was in
1529 iujiz
construction it was jgQ4~ This meant that in
relation to wages, etc, paid, the gross operating 
surplus of the mining sector was about five times 
that in the manufacturing sector and about four 
times that in the construction sector. See ABS, 
Australian National Accounts, 1977-78, Canberra, 
AGPS, 1978, Cat. No. 5204.0.
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Estimated total impact of developments in mineral investment and production: annual rates, $ million,
average 1979-80 prices
TABLE 1
Early 1980s Mid 1980s Late 1980s
Decade
average
Value added in:
Mining 22 3 792 6 528 3 105
Manufacturing 449 792 533 577
Construction 372 453 177 338
Transport 88 239 307 199
Other services 418 784 622 589
Total Australian production 1 349 6 060 8 167 4 808
Gross value c.i.f. of imports 394 719 507 525
Total: 1 743 6 779 8 674 5333
Source: BIE, op. cit. 
TABLE 2
Summary of employment effects of investment and operating phases, by period and industry group
Early 1980s Mid 1980s Late 1980s
Industry
No. of 
persons
Pro­
portion 
of current 
employ­
ment (a) 
(%)
No. of 
persons
Pro­
portion 
of current 
employ­
ment (a) 
(%)
No. of 
persons
Pro­
portion 
of current 
employ­
ment (a)
Mining 510 0.6 7 933 9.8 15 234 19.0
Manufacturing 19 736 1.6 35 035 2.8 24 946 2.0
Transport 
& storage 5 139 1.5 16 818 5.1 22 860 7.0
Construction 22 303 4.7 27 185 5.7 10 470 2.2
Other services 23 032 0.7 43 251 1.4 33 377 1.0
Total: 70 720 1.1 130 222 2.0 106 887 1.7
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (1980). The Labour Force May 1980. Catalogue No. 6203.0.
Note: (a) Employment associated with mineral developments as a proportion of total employment in each industry as at 
May 1980.
as cited in BIE Report, op.cit.
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Power, Conflict and Control in Australian 
Trade Unions, edited by Kathryn Cole, 
Pelican Books, 1982, ix + 309pp., $9.95. 
Reviewed by Barrie Blears.
This collection of essays on various aspects of 
the trade unions is most timely, given that many in 
the radical and industrial movement are 
embarking on the further development of a 
forward-looking strategy. It presents to the reader 
discussion on a wide range of subjects including the 
relationship of the trade unions to the ALP, a 
number of views and descriptions of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, the 
media's manipulation of the trade union image — 
and other aspects such as the ACTU, trade union 
democracy, shop-floor activity, the union activity 
of women and so on.
The writers are many and varied and range from 
Sir Richard Kirby, with his scarcely-concealed 
dislike for the Fraser government's attempts to 
coerce the court, to a fine socio-political treatment 
of the law and industrial conflict by Breen 
Creighton of Melbourne University. They manage 
to cover a wide range of trade union territory.
Looking at the book in more detail, Edward 
Davis argues in the chapter 'Trade Unions and the 
Media" that for a great variety of reasons, not just 
sheer monopolistic ownership and class bias, the 
press has been able to present a very bad public 
image of the industrial movement in general.
Kathryn Cole, in "Unions and the Labor Party" 
does a good job in tracing the relationship between 
the unions and the ALP and discusses the 
dichotomy between the political and industrial 
wings. She also looks at the Whitlam era and 
includes a very good treatment of the developing 
white collar and services sections. She views them 
as having limited connections with the Labor Party 
or politics. Her account of the lack of trade union 
ideology inside the ALP is interesting and she 
concludes that the unions at federal level don't 
really achieve full advantage from their actual 
input into the parly.
Don Rawson's treatment of the ACTU's history 
and future prospects is also useful. Among many 
aspects, he points out that the apparent ALP 
support for the ACTU, in terms of those who 
belong to Labor Party affiliated unions, has
decreased from the peak of 1969. This decrease in 
support, he believes, leaves many question marks 
for the future. Rawson also asks if the activities of 
the ACTU have outgrown its actual strength, but 
goes on to trace the significance of its recent 
growth. Rawson believes that the ACTU has a 
more important role to play relative to non-Labor 
governments and this raises some interesting 
questions.
Perhaps one of his most interesting observations 
is the growth of militancy in various non-manual 
sections of the workforce, together with a 
breakdown in traditional voting patterns. This has 
led to a very different ball-game than that 
recognised or understood by old-style Labor 
supporters of the 1940s, '50s and the '60s.
By researching varying membership sizes, 
leadership methods and political influences, 
Edward Davis, in 'Trade Union Democracy", has 
a look at union structures. He generally concludes 
that there isn't a correlation, necessarily, between 
the size of a union and its internal democracy, one 
way or another. He suggests that considerable care 
and thought is required in viewing the relation 
between internal union organisation and the way 
the rank and file can influence decision-making. 
His research gives a limited insight into this area; 
readers will have to add their own views and 
experiences to his conclusions.
Industrial legislation
Of a number of treatments of the question of 
industrial laws and their enforcement on the trade 
unions, I was impressed, as mentioned earlier, with 
the chapter by Breen Creighton on "Law and the 
Control of Industrial Conflict". This chapter gives 
a good class-related analysis of the framing of 
industrial legislation and goes on to uncover how 
unworkable the law can be if the union or unions 
and their members decide that they will 
deliberately flout the law, or operate in such a way 
as to render it inoperative. He also looks at many 
of the penal provisions oi the Arbitration Acts and 
sets them out so the reader can learn, in some 
detail, their actual meaning and application.
Richard Mitchell and Stuart Rosewarne set out 
to expose the basic contradictions that lie at the 
bottom of the Liberal-National Country Parties 
denials of class antagonism in their union policies,
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and their constant statements that usually place all 
blame for disputes on trade union action. This is 
well discussed in the context of the moves by the 
Fraser government to ostensibly protect the rights 
of the individual" (in terms of union members) over 
and above the rights of the group. The authors 
agree that there are problems but, basically, they 
see these moves are being made to hamper the 
democratic activities of the rank and file and 
associate the union movement with an aura of 
autocracy and bullying.
The chapter on "Shop Stewards, a Western 
Australian Study" is particularly interesting 
because a number of contradictions in the nature 
of the steward's role are uncovered. To me it 
reveals how stewards view themselves principally 
as leaders and how little trade union organisation 
has come to grips with further democratising rank- 
and-file struggle. In other words, energy is 
channelled (and restricted) into the "big man 
theory", ie Bob Hawke, the union hot-shot. Little 
attention is given to the rank and file who are not 
trusted to develop their shop-floor organisation. 
The article demonstrates that workers are 
protected by the structure from making mistakes, 
and all their tactics are basically decided centrally. 
Consequently, they miss out on political lessons 
which are useful only for individuals such as the 
embryonic union official in the shape of a shop 
steward. This is one conclusion I draw from this 
study; perhaps other readers will get a totally 
different impression?
Edna Ryan and Helen Prendergast generally 
paint a not-too-optimistic picture in "Unions are 
for Women Too" although, at some levels, others 
could say that Ryan and Prendergast have placed 
too much emphasis on "window dressing" exercises 
by unions. There remains a tremendously long 
hard road to hoe for women to gain their rightful 
place in the unions.
The Energy Question by Gerald Foley, with 
Charlotte Nassim, (2nd ed), 1981, Penguin, 
327 pp., $6.95. Reviewed by Hugh Saddler.
The first edition of this book was published in 
1976. It was, and has remained, the most 
comprehensive, accurate, balanced and clearly 
written introduction in English to the physical 
background to the consideration of energy 
problems.
It deals with energy flows in the biosphere and
in hum an society, the principles of 
thermodynamics and energy resources. It gives 
brief accounts of all the many important energy 
extraction and conversion processes.
This new edition retains all that, with some 
appropriate updating and the excision of a few 
short sections which have been overtaken by 
events. It also eliminates the special emphasis 
which was previously given to the British situation. 
(Even in the first edition this emphasis was by no 
means excessive compared with the average 
American book purporting to give a world 
perspective.)
In its concluding chapters, the book 
concentrates on the need to plan for a transition to 
relatively scarce, relatively costly energy sources. It 
emphasises the (not original) point that until 
recently the historical trend of the energy industry 
has been from costly and complex energy sources 
to cheap and simple ones. All future trends must be 
in the opposite direction.
On the whole it is rather gloomy about the 
future, expressing particular concern about the 
prospects for the ordinary people in 
underdeveloped countries. Nor are the authors 
very hopeful about the potential of solar and other 
renewable energy sources over the next twenty 
or so years (though they are more optimistic about 
energy conservation). They are sharply critical of 
both the optimistic vision of Lovins and the 
mindless growth-for-ever perspective of his 
opponents.
What this book does not do is deal with any of 
the important economic issues relating to energy, 
with the exception of the relationship between 
energy and GNP, which is well dealt with. Nor does 
it explicitly address political issues, though the 
authors' general sympathies can be read clearly 
enough between the lines (they are for the poor and 
weak and against the rich and powerful). This is 
not meant as criticism; the authors set out to deal 
with a particular set of topics and do so very well at 
convenient length.
This does not mean that people whose prime 
interest is the politics of energy should not bother 
with this book. On the contrary, if you do not 
already have it, go out and buy it, because it is the 
best compendium of the background factual 
information needed to make a sensible 
contribution to the energy policy debate. However, 
if you already have a first edition, I doubt if the 
improvements in this new edition, welcome as they 
are, make it worth buying to replace your old copy.
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POLISH VOICES
Here is a unique social document where Polish men 
and women speak for themselves about the great 
issues being faced in their country today. The voices 
are sometimes strident, sometimes cautious, and 
mostly optimistic. They offer different versions o f  
events which have been in the headlines over the last 
year. Taken together, they express history in the 
making.
Denis Freney, who visited Poland in August 1981, 
interviewed this cross-section o f Polish society. 
Polish Voices, published by Australian Left Review, 
price now $2.00, plus postage.
Marx Centenary, 1883-1983
Next year in March 1983, Australian Left Review proposes to 
organise a number o f events to mark the 100th anniversary o f the 
death o f  Karl M arx. These events could include symposia, 
seminars, conferences and other discussions.
We believe that this proposal for 1983 could be a valuable 
project where the influence o f marxism can be considered and 
through which the problems and possibilities o f  the socialist 
movement in Australia can be assessed. We would hope that such a 
project, attracting the support o f  a variety o f  socialists, will also 
contribute to the unity o f the Australian socialist movement.
We invite interested persons to contact either o f the existing 
editorial groups in Sydney and Melbourne and to  join with ALR in 
establishing a M arx Centenary Committee.
ALR Editorial Collective, 
PO Box A247, Sydney South 2000.
